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§§§ 
“Bartik has a gift for clear, straightforward exposition. This new book makes a com-
prehensive and compelling case for a strong public commitment to early childhood 
education.” 
—Nancy Folbre, University of Massachusetts–Amherst, and author of Valuing 
Children: Rethinking the Economics of the Family 
“From Preschool to Prosperity is an enormously useful book that merits wide cir-
culation. It does a great job of synthesizing, and the proposal makes educational 
sense.” 
—David Kirp, University of California, Berkeley, and author of Kids First 
“A wise and thoughtful exposition of why we should invest in early childhood edu-
cation. Bartik does an excellent job of debunking some common myths.” 
—William Gormley, Georgetown University, and author of Voices for Our Children 
“The economic benefits of investing in high-quality early childhood education are 
clear and backed by an impressive amount of research, as laid out in Tim Bartik’s 
book. With businesses concerned about securing a future skilled workforce, with 
our military leaders concerned about the future supply of qualified recruits, and with 
our society concerned about the troubling increase in income inequality, we should 
be looking at proven investments in children and youth that strengthen our human 
capital and the future of our economy.” 
—Arthur J. Rolnick, University of Minnesota; former Senior Vice President and 
Director of Research, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 
“Early childhood education is among the best investments we can make as a coun-
try. Timothy Bartik explains why with hardheaded and clear analysis. He makes a 
compelling case for business leaders to engage in their communities to ensure we 
properly invest in the future of our youth.” 
—Lenny Mendonca, Director Emeritus, McKinsey and Company 
“There is no product the U.S. economy produces that is more important than ready-
for-life 18-year-olds. Without them there is no future workforce or an economy! 
Business people are beginning to understand this. In his second extraordinary 
book on early childhood, Tim Bartik explains how early learning investment can
strengthen the national economy and address economic inequality by increasing 
economic opportunity. Are there today any two economic topics more crucial than 
these? A must-read for business leaders worldwide.” 
—Robert Dugger, Managing Partner, Hanover Provident Capital 
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Preface 
This book is my second book on preschool. My first book, Investing in 
Kids: Early Childhood Programs and Local Economic Development (2011), 
focused on exploring the connection between early childhood programs and 
the economic development of American states and metro areas, and in par-
ticular on comparing early childhood programs with business tax incentives. 
Why a second book? Two reasons. First, the present book is much, much 
shorter, which I hope will mean it is more reader-friendly. Second, the present 
book is more focused on the key policy issues that today face early childhood 
education in the United States. 
This book provides concise and research-based information to the fol-
lowing audiences: 
 Professors looking for a review for their students of what research 
says about the effects of early childhood education; 
 Members of the business community who want to see bottom-line 
figures on preschool’s economic effects; 
 Early childhood advocates who are puzzled about how to respond 
to common arguments given against early childhood education; 
 Federal, state, or local administrators exploring ideas about how to 
better design and manage early childhood programs; 
 Voters without preschool-aged children who might wonder, “What’s 
my stake in this policy debate?”; 
 Federal, state, or local legislators who need to develop specific 
early childhood programs; 
 Anyone interested in how early childhood programs might both 
boost American economic growth and reduce inequality. 
My aim has been to make this book clear and accessible to a broad, 
nontechnical audience, while also giving readers the evidence and arguments 
they need to make up their own minds. Early childhood education is not 
just important to parents and preschool teachers; it is important to everyone 
interested in America’s future prosperity. I hope this book contributes to the 
needed democratic debate, at all levels of government, over a possible signifi-
cant expansion of early childhood education. 
xiii 

 
 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Wouldn’t it be great if there was some feasible policy that could 
boost the American economy and enlarge opportunities for more of 
our children? 
We’re in luck. Our economic future and our children’s future can 
be significantly improved by expanding high-quality early childhood 
education programs, such as pre-K education. 
In this book, early childhood education is examined from an 
economic perspective. The book evaluates the empirical evidence on 
the economic payoff to investing in early childhood education. What 
does this evidence imply for public policy? 
An economic perspective includes quantifying the effects of early 
childhood education as benefits and costs measured in dollar terms. 
Although early childhood education programs have many benefits, 
this book will focus on one key benefit: earnings increases. Children 
who participate in high-quality early childhood education will tend to 
have higher earnings as adults, because these programs help unlock 
the child’s potential for skills development. 
An economic perspective includes comparing benefits with costs. 
Not all early childhood education programs are equal in their “bang 
for the buck.” 
An economic perspective includes examining who should pay for 
early childhood education programs. A key question is, “Who ben-
efits from early childhood education?” Why should a taxpayer pay 
for other people’s children? One reason is that early childhood educa-
tion can do more than benefit former child participants. Early child-
hood education can have large spillover benefits for others in soci-
ety, including other workers, families, state and local economies, and 
government budgets. These spillover benefits are sufficiently local to 
justify support for these programs by state and local governments. 
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But federal support may be helpful for program evaluation to ensure 
quality, and for early childhood programs targeted at the poor. 
WHAT ARE EARLY CHILDHOOD 
EDUCATION PROGRAMS? 
In this book, early childhood education programs include any 
publicly supported program that has as a principal purpose providing 
children younger than age five with educational services. The goal of 
such educational services is to improve the child’s lifetime opportuni-
ties. Education is defined broadly to include cognitive skills as well 
as social or character skills. Early childhood education includes pre-K 
programs, parenting programs that provide parents with support in 
the art of parenting, and child care services with a strong educational 
component. 
Early childhood education includes diverse programs. These 
programs can be targeted at children from disadvantaged families, 
or they can be more universal. (To avoid misinterpretation, let me 
state that “universal” programs are not compulsory. Rather, universal 
programs are available as an option for all families, without means-
testing.) Early childhood education programs can be financed by fed-
eral, state, and local governments. These programs can be full-time 
from birth to age five, or they can operate for only one school year for 
a half-day at age four. Which approach will be the most cost-effective 
in increasing economic growth and expanding opportunities? 
The book’s focus is on how early childhood education can influ-
ence the child’s future, and how that benefits society. But the book 
also considers benefits for parents. For example, child care frees up 
parent time for work or education. 
Early childhood education includes diverse pre-K programs. 
Pre-K programs include the federally funded Head Start program, 
begun in 1965 as part of the War on Poverty. Head Start currently 
serves around one million children at a cost of around $8 billion. 
Pre-K programs include past experimental programs such as the Perry 
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Preschool Program, a 1960s program run by the HighScope Educa-
tional Research Foundation in Ypsilanti, Michigan, with follow-up 
data still being collected today. Pre-K programs also include many 
large-scale state and local pre-K programs. This includes Chicago’s 
Child-Parent Center Program (CPC), as well as state-financed pre-K 
programs in more than 40 states. 
As of 2012–2013, state pre-K programs served 1.3 million chil-
dren at an annual cost of over $6 billion.1 State pre-K has expanded 
in the past decade: From 2002 to 2013, the percentage of all U.S. 
four-year-olds in state pre-K programs doubled, from 14 percent to 28 
percent. Recently, state pre-K programs have faced cutbacks because 
of state fiscal problems. 
Some state pre-K programs are close to universal. Oklahoma’s 
pre-K program provides pre-K services to 74 percent of all four-year-
olds in the state, with an additional 13 percent served by Head Start. 
Seven other states provide pre-K services to more than half of the 
state’s four-year-olds: Florida, Vermont, Wisconsin, West Virginia, 
Iowa, Georgia, and Texas. 
Recent proposals have been made to expand federal support for 
state pre-K programs. The short-term political outlook is that large-
scale expansion of federal support is unlikely.2 
Early childhood education includes programs to improve parent-
ing. These parenting programs often operate through home visits, in 
which a trained visitor interacts at home with the parent and child. 
The most extensively evaluated of such home-visiting/parenting 
programs is the Nurse Family Partnership (NFP). The NFP involves 
nurses making home visits from the prenatal period up to age two to 
a disadvantaged first-time mom and her child. The NFP has expanded 
with the Affordable Care Act (ACA): The ACA authorized about $0.4 
billion per year for research-proven home-visiting programs, includ-
ing the NFP. 
Early childhood education includes child care with a significant 
focus on the child’s education. The most researched such program is 
the Abecedarian Project. This experiment, begun in North Carolina 
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in 1972, provided five years of full-time educational child care and 
pre-K services for children from six weeks after birth to age five. 
More recently, a program similar to Abecedarian, called Educare, has 
been promoted around the United States by the Buffett Early Child-
hood Fund and the Ounce of Prevention Fund. 
This book’s definition of early childhood education does not 
include subsidized child care programs that do not focus on educa-
tion. For example, the Child Care and Development Fund, a federal 
block grant to states created by welfare reform, has such low funding 
per child and such weak quality screens that it clearly is not aimed at 
better child development. 
WHAT ARE THE BENEFITS FROM EARLY
CHILDHOOD EDUCATION?
The main direct benefit of early childhood education is the result-
ing improvement in the future life course of the child. The child’s 
better life course is manifested in part by higher lifetime earnings. 
These earnings are valuable to the child. These earnings also mean 
the child is playing a more productive role in the American economy. 
And, these earnings enable the child to be more self-sufficient, a bet-
ter husband or wife, a better parent, and a better contributor to neigh-
borhood and civic life. 
Greater legal earnings are accompanied by lower criminal activ-
ity. Lower costs of the criminal justice system and lower crime vic-
timization are important social benefits of early childhood education. 
A more fundamental spillover benefit of early childhood educa-
tion is what it means for overall economic productivity. As explored 
in Chapter 6, when some workers gain more skills, wages increase for 
other workers. Businesses are more likely to invest in new technolo-
gies if average skills increase. 
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HOW CAN EARLY CHILDHOOD EDUCATION AFFECT
THE CHILD’S FUTURE LIFE COURSE?
A skeptic could argue that no program that provides services for 
such a limited time—say a pre-K program for one school year at age 
four—could affect a child’s future earnings at age 40. Government 
intervention could only work, a skeptic might say, by taking over the 
child’s upbringing. Such a role is inappropriate for a government that 
respects individual liberty. 
But, as explored in Chapter 2, the evidence suggests that even 
very time-limited early childhood education can have large effects 
on adult outcomes. This empirical evidence is surprising. Obviously 
it can’t be that knowing a few more letters and numbers at kindergar-
ten entrance influences adult earnings at age 40 by any direct effect. 
Somehow, what happens early to the child’s development must have 
some indirect benefits for future development. 
A plausible logic for long-term effects of early childhood educa-
tion is as follows. The child’s brain is more malleable prior to age five 
than in later years. Suppose an early childhood program increases the 
child’s skills: cognitive skills such as math and reading skills; social 
skills such as getting along with peers and teachers; character skills 
such as patience, persistence, and self-confidence. 
All of these skills prepare the child for later learning. The five-
year-old with more skills will do better in kindergarten, interacting 
better with peers and the kindergarten teacher, and gaining further 
self-confidence. As a result of this greater learning in kindergarten, 
this child enters first grade better set up for further learning. And so 
on. 
Early childhood education can develop skills that lead to more 
skills growth later. Early childhood education investment appreciates 
over time rather than depreciates. As Nobel Prize–winning economist 
James Heckman has said, “Skill begets skill” (Heckman 2000, p. 3). 
The effect of any early childhood education program is relative 
to what would have happened without the program. Even without 
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new early childhood education programs, there are existing public 
programs. In addition, most parents spend much time educating their 
child—for example, through talking and reading with their child and 
exposing the child to the natural world, playgrounds, museums, and 
the library. Parents may also spend money on private child care or 
pre-K. The benefits of any early childhood education program depend 
upon its superiority to what is already being provided by the public 
sector, or to what the parents are able to provide on their own. This 
means that the benefits of early childhood education may vary with 
the abilities or resources of the child’s parents. 
Parents may be unable to “go it alone” because early childhood 
education is often expensive. For example, high-quality full-day 
pre-K may cost over $10,000 per school year. Such a cost is difficult 
for even middle-class parents to afford. 
As explored in Chapters 3 and 5, the benefit-cost analysis of early 
childhood education also depends on costs. The cost per child will 
tend to be higher at earlier ages, when class sizes will be lower. 
Alternative services available to parents and higher costs are two 
reasons why the earliest possible interventions may not offer the high-
est ratio of benefits to costs. Brain neurons may indeed develop more 
at ages one and two; however, earlier intervention has a high opportu-
nity cost, because it substitutes for something that many parents can 
provide on their own. Earlier intervention also has higher program 
costs per child, because younger children require more individual 
attention. 
A PROPOSAL FOR EARLY CHILDHOOD EDUCATION 
Based on this research, this book argues that we know enough to 
move forward with a full-scale proposal for early childhood education. 
This proposal has economic benefits exceeding costs, and it would 
particularly help children from poor and working-class families. 
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The proposal includes 
 Universal full-day pre-K at age four for children from all 
income backgrounds; 
 For low-income children, developmental child care and 
pre-K from birth to age five; 
 For low-income families, home-visiting programs to improve 
parenting. 
This proposal’s national cost is $79 billion annually.3 This cost is 
2 percent of total government taxes.4 
This proposal would not reverse all of the recent increases in 
U.S. income inequality since 1979, but it would help. For low-income 
Americans, this proposal would offset most of the increased income 
inequality since 1979; for middle-income Americans, this proposal 
would offset one-sixth of the increased income inequality (see Chap-
ter 7). 
THE PLAN OF THE BOOK 
Chapter 2 summarizes the empirical evidence that has led most 
researchers to believe that early childhood programs can affect adult 
outcomes. 
Chapter 3 compares adult earnings benefits from early childhood 
education with costs. 
Chapter 4 analyzes common criticisms made of the empirical evi-
dence for early childhood education. 
Chapter 5 discusses how the benefits and costs of early childhood 
programs vary with program features, such as classroom quality, pro-
gram duration, and the income of the child’s family. 
Chapter 6 explores social benefits of early childhood programs. 
Chapter 7 outlines a specific early childhood proposal. 
Chapter 8 puts early childhood education in the context of past 
efforts to reform American education. 
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In sum, this book argues the following: 
 Many early childhood education programs have rigorous 
evidence for high benefit-cost ratios. 
 We know something about what types of programs have 
the biggest bang for the buck, and how to improve program 
quality over time. 
 Benefits of early childhood education are broad enough that 
taxpayer support is justified. 
 Benefits of early childhood education are local enough to 
justify support by state and local governments. 
 Early childhood education can play a significant role in an 
overall economic strategy to enhance U.S. economic growth 
and broaden economic opportunities. 
  
Chapter 2 
What Is the Evidence on the 
Earnings Effects of High-Quality 
Early Childhood Education, and 
Why Should We Believe It? 
The empirical evidence is that high-quality early childhood educa-
tion has large effects on a child’s future adult earnings. Early child-
hood education can increase a child’s future adult earnings by over 25 
percent, and many programs have average future earnings effects of 
3 percent or much greater. Over a career, even a 3 percent earnings 
boost amounts to many thousands of dollars. 
But why should we believe this evidence? This chapter addresses 
this question. 
WHY THE RESEARCH EVIDENCE FOR EARLY
CHILDHOOD EDUCATION IS CREDIBLE 
Why are the large benefit estimates for some early childhood pro-
grams believable? These estimates are believable because they come 
from rigorous research. Rigorous research means that the studies have 
good comparison groups. These comparison groups are made up of 
children similar to the children who participate in early childhood 
education, except for that participation. This comparability means 
that the estimated earnings increases are due to the program, not to 
preexisting differences between the program group and the compari-
son group. 
Good comparison groups are needed because children are 
diverse. The child who participates in an early childhood educa-
tion program may differ from the child who does not. Differences 
in observed child characteristics can be controlled for. We cannot 
9 
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control for differences in child characteristics that are unobserved. If 
we lack good comparison groups, post-program differences may be 
due to unobserved characteristics, not the program. Perhaps program 
children have more ambitious parents, which biases the study toward 
finding positive program effects. Alternatively, perhaps program chil-
dren have more preexisting problems, which lead the parents to enroll 
their children in the program. These preexisting problems will bias 
the research toward finding negative program effects. 
The problem of bad comparison groups is called selection bias. 
Families self-select into enrolling their children in early childhood 
education. The families who self-select may have children with dif-
ferent unobserved characteristics from those who do not. 
Bias may also occur because of the program’s selection proce-
dures. The program may screen out children with too many problems, 
or it may enroll the neediest children. Outcome differences between 
the program and comparison groups may be due to this program 
selection. 
RANDOM ASSIGNMENT STUDIES 
How can research on early childhood education solve the selec-
tion bias problem? In some studies, the solution is that children are 
selected for the program using random assignment. Long-term effects 
of early childhood education are estimated in several well-done ran-
dom assignment studies: Perry Preschool, the Abecedarian program, 
and the Nurse Family Partnership. 
Perry was a half-day pre-K program at ages three and four in 
Ypsilanti, Michigan, from 1962 to 1967. The Abecedarian program 
was a full-time, full-year child care and pre-K program, from birth to 
age five, conducted from 1972 to 1977 in Chapel Hill, North Caro-
lina. (The current Educare program is similar to Abecedarian.) The 
Nurse Family Partnership provides 2.5 years of nurse home visits to 
first-time mothers, from the prenatal period to age two. It has been 
subject to three experiments: 1) Elmira, New York (1977); 2) Mem-
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phis (1987); and 3) Denver (1994). The NFP is an ongoing program 
with many U.S. sites. Perry, Abecedarian, and the NFP were all tar-
geted at disadvantaged families. 
These experiments found large long-term benefits. Perry Pre-
school on average increased its child participants’ future earnings by 
19 percent. The Abecedarian program increased adult educational 
attainment and employment rates: The adult education effects predict 
a lifetime earnings increase of 15 percent. The higher adult employ-
ment rates, which exceed the boost expected from the educational 
attainment gains, bring the predicted lifetime earnings increase to 26 
percent.5 The Nurse Family Partnership increased school test scores 
and reduced crime. These effects predict an average increase in life-
time earnings of 3 percent.6 
Random assignment is the gold standard for ensuring that esti-
mated program effects are credible. Random assignment means that 
we would expect the “treatment” and “control” groups to have the 
same average level of unobserved characteristics. (The “treatment” 
group are the children randomly assigned to participate in the pro-
gram; the “control” group are the children randomly assigned to not 
participate.) Any sizable difference in outcomes between the treat-
ment and control groups is likely due to the “treatment” (the program 
participation), not to unobserved characteristics.7 
OTHER LONG-TERM STUDIES WITH GOOD 
COMPARISON GROUPS: HEAD START
In addition to these small random assignment experiments, rigor-
ous evidence for long-run effects of early childhood education comes 
from large-scale programs that are not random assignment experi-
ments but that still have good comparison groups.8 These studies have 
good comparison groups because they use data from natural experi-
ments: natural accidents have resulted in similar persons having dif-
ferent access to early childhood education. Rigorous evidence for 
the long-term benefits of large-scale programs comes from studies of 
Head Start and of the Chicago Child-Parent Center Program. 
12 Bartik 
Evidence on Head Start’s long-term effects comes from two types 
of studies with good comparison groups. First, a study by Ludwig 
and Miller (2007) compares long-run outcomes for children in two 
different types of counties: 1) counties that adopted Head Start in its 
early years and 2) otherwise similar counties that did not. Ludwig 
and Miller focus on counties whose early participation in Head Start 
occurred because Head Start provided extra technical assistance to 
high-poverty counties to help them write a good Head Start applica-
tion. This technical assistance boosted Head Start program activity 
in these counties, compared to similar counties that just missed the 
poverty cutoff. 
Ludwig and Miller compare long-term outcomes for children in 
counties that just made the cutoff for Head Start technical assistance 
versus children in similar counties that just missed the cutoff. This is 
a good comparison group, as it is hard to think of any reason, other 
than the Head Start participation, that would lead to large differences 
in child outcomes in counties on either side of the cutoff. Ludwig and 
Miller found that children in counties that made the cutoff had lower 
mortality rates after Head Start was begun, and higher educational 
attainment later on. 
Second, other Head Start studies compare siblings, one of whom 
participated in Head Start and the other of whom did not. This is a 
good comparison group because the comparison holds constant unob-
served family characteristics. 
A sibling comparison study by Garces, Thomas, and Currie 
(2002) suggests that Head Start increases educational attainment and 
reduces crime for some groups. Another sibling comparison study by 
Deming (2009) finds effects of Head Start on adult outcomes that 
predict an average earnings increase of 11 percent. 
THE CHICAGO CHILD-PARENT CENTER PROGRAM 
Evidence on the long-term effects of large-scale pre-K programs 
comes from studies of the Chicago Child-Parent Center Program 
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(CPC). This program, started in 1967 and run by the Chicago Public 
Schools, provides participants with from one to two years of half-day 
pre-K at ages three and four. About half of the children in CPC partic-
ipated only at age four, and the other half at both ages three and four. 
Research on the CPC program uses as a comparison group chil-
dren in similar neighborhoods in which the CPC program was not 
offered. This is a good comparison group because program participa-
tion depends on the accidents of geography, not on self-selection or 
program selection.9 
CPC research has now followed former CPC participants, and the 
comparison group, through age 28. These results predict that CPC on 
average increases earnings by 8 percent.10 
PREDICTING LONG-TERM EARNINGS EFFECTS 
FROM SHORT-TERM TEST SCORE EFFECTS 
Direct evidence on the long-term earnings effects of early child-
hood education is better than indirect evidence. But long-term stud-
ies are scarce and expensive. Long-term studies also cannot produce 
results for more recent programs. 
Long-term earnings effects can be predicted from a program’s 
effects on test scores in the short term. Research by Chetty et al. 
(2011), Currie and Thomas (2012), and others has produced good 
evidence on how early test scores affect adult earnings.11 
How good are such predictions? For early childhood education, 
early test-score effects tend to underpredict long-run earnings effects. 
Table 2.1 shows test score predictions and adult earnings effects for 
four early childhood programs.12 
The initial post-program test scores tend to underpredict eventual 
adult earnings effects.13 The third-grade test scores are even more of 
an underprediction of adult earnings effects. Possible reasons for this 
fading of results are discussed in Chapter 4. The bottom line is that 
test score predictions of adult earnings effects provide a conservative 
estimate of program benefits. 
  Table 2.1  Adult Earnings Effects, Compared with Predicted Earnings Effects Based on Test Scores 
14 
Long-run earnings effects 
based on adult outcomes 
(% of adult earnings) 
Predicted earnings 
effects based on end-
of-program test scores 
(% of adult earnings) 
Predicted earnings 
effects based on 
third-grade test scores 
(% of adult earnings) 
Perry Preschool 19 12 2 to 5 
Abecedarian 26 13 7 to 11 
Chicago Child-Parent Center Pre-K 8 8 1 
Head Start 11 3 to 6 1 to 3 
NOTE: Adult earnings effects are shown as predicted average percentage increase in earnings due to the program, compared to expected earn-
ings if the person had not participated in the program. End-of-program test scores are for the end of preschool or for kindergarten. 
SOURCE: Author’s calculations, as explained in text and endnotes. 
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Hundreds of studies of early childhood education programs have 
estimated test score effects. Analyses of this research have been done 
by Camilli et al. (2010) and Leak et al. (2010). Leak et al. find aver-
age short-term test score effects that predict adult earnings effects of 
5 percent.14 Camilli et al. find average test score effects that predict 
adult earnings effects of 9 percent.15 
But the Camilli et al. and Leak et al. meta-analyses are not precise 
enough to guide policy. The average effects come from studies with 
diverse methodologies of variable quality, and the programs studied 
have different designs, costs, and quality. 
This book will focus on a few of these studies that have particu-
larly good comparison groups. These studies include the following 
three categories: 1) the Infant Health and Development Program; 
2) North Carolina’s Smart Start and More at Four programs; and
3) studies of state and local pre-K programs that have been done 
using regression discontinuity methods, which will be explained 
below. 
INFANT HEALTH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM 
The Infant Health and Development Program (IHDP) was an 
experiment conducted from 1985 to 1988 at eight U.S. sites. The 
program provided high-quality full-time child care at ages one and 
two.16 The program replicated features of the Abecedarian program. 
However, whereas the Abecedarian program provided full-time child 
care and pre-K from birth to age five, the IHDP only provided such 
services for two years. 
The IHDP was a random assignment experiment. Duncan and 
Sojourner’s (2013) analysis of these data suggest that for low-income 
children, the IHDP had many statistically significant and substan-
tively large effects on test scores.17 The third-grade test effects predict 
that the IHDP would on average boost adult earnings by 12 percent.18 
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NORTH CAROLINA’S SMART START PROGRAM, 
AND MORE AT FOUR 
Smart Start is a state of North Carolina program, begun in 1993, 
that provides state aid to county partnerships that try to improve the 
quality of local early-childhood services, from birth to age four. Most 
Smart Start funds have been devoted to child care, including child care 
subsidies to low-income families and training for child care centers. 
More at Four was a state of North Carolina program from 2001 
to 2011 that supported full-day pre-K at age four. It has since been 
renamed NC Pre-K. 
A recent study (Ladd, Muschkin, and Dodge 2014) relies on a 
natural experiment: Both Smart Start and More at Four were gradu-
ally rolled out to different counties. The researchers use this natu-
ral variation in funding by county and time period to estimate these 
programs’ effects on third-grade test scores. This study has a good 
comparison group because it is unclear why third-grade test scores in 
different counties would change in response to lagged program fund-
ing except for a true program effect. 
Based on Ladd et al.’s estimated test score effects, typical levels 
of Smart Start or More at Four funding are predicted to increase aver-
age future earnings in a county by 1.6 percent for Smart Start and by 
2.9 percent for More at Four.19 Over an entire career, a 1.6 percent 
earnings boost is a lot of money. 
These average effects include many children who receive few 
or no services from these two programs. In the typical county, only 
25 percent of four-year-olds participated in pre-K funded by More 
at Four, so it is remarkable that the program increases average earn-
ings by 2.9 percent. Extrapolation implies that increasing a county’s 
enrollment in More at Four from zero to 100 percent would boost 
earnings by over 11 percent. For Smart Start, average spending per 
child under the age of five is only $220 annually, so the 1.6 percent 
earnings effect is large compared to this cost. 
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STATE AND LOCAL PRE-K PROGRAMS: 
THE REGRESSION DISCONTINUITY EVIDENCE 
Rigorous evidence for large-scale state or local pre-K programs 
comes from studies that look at student performance on the same test 
at entrance to the pre-K program for four-year-olds and at entrance 
to kindergarten. Such studies have been done in many states, includ-
ing New Jersey, Michigan, West Virginia, South Carolina, Oklahoma, 
New Mexico, and Tennessee, and in cities such as Tulsa, Boston, 
and Kalamazoo (Bartik 2013; Bartik, Gormley, and Adelstein 2012; 
Hustedt, Barnett, and Jung 2008; Hustedt et al. 2010; Weiland and 
Yoshikawa 2013; Wong et al. 2008). 
These studies use a methodology called “regression discontinu-
ity.” This methodology relies on pre-K and kindergarten entrance 
being based on an age cutoff. Students entering pre-K, and students 
who graduated from pre-K and are entering kindergarten, are similar 
in family or program factors that led to pre-K participation. Selection 
bias should not be a big problem. 
What does explain why one child is a pre-K entrant, and the other 
child is a pre-K graduate, is the child’s age. The child entering kin-
dergarten will on average be one year older than the child entering 
pre-K. But ages vary over a one-year period for each group. There 
are children entering pre-K who are just a few days younger than 
children entering kindergarten. These children should be similar in 
both observed and unobserved characteristics, except that the slightly 
older child has benefited from a year in a pre-K program. 
We can estimate how much higher student test scores are at kin-
dergarten entrance for those children who went to preschool, com-
pared to children just starting in those same preschool programs. 
Using the variation in test scores with age, we can estimate how test 
scores vary with age. We can then see whether there is a “jump”—a 
“discontinuity”—in scores for the child who is just old enough for 
kindergarten entrance, and who has experienced a year of pre-K, ver-
sus the child who is a little too young for kindergarten entrance, and 
therefore is just entering pre-K. 
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Figure 2.1 shows an example of this jump in student test scores 
associated with Tulsa’s pre-K program (Bartik, Gormley, and 
Adelstein 2012). The figure shows fall test scores along the verti-
cal axis for groups of Tulsa students, sorted along the horizontal axis 
by age.20 The students to the left of the vertical line are too young to 
enter kindergarten and are just entering Tulsa’s pre-K program. The 
students to the right of the vertical line are former Tulsa pre-K par-
ticipants who are just entering kindergarten. All these students were 
given the same tests at the same time in the fall. 
Test scores in most of the figure go up smoothly with age. But 
there is an abrupt jump at the cutoff between pre-K entrants and kin-
dergarten entrants. The most plausible explanation of this jump is that 
Tulsa’s pre-K program increases test scores. The students just to the 
left and right of the cutoff are almost the same age, are shown in 
the full study to be similar in all observed characteristics, and differ 
mainly in that the group just to the right has had one year of Tulsa
pre-K. Therefore, it seems likely that the jump is due to pre-K.21 
Many studies have found such test score jumps in comparing 
entrants in state pre-K programs with kindergarten entrants who are 
pre-K graduates. These test score jumps tend to be in the range of 
increasing student learning during the pre-K year by perhaps 40 to 80 
percent, compared to what children would learn on their own, without 
the state pre-K program.22 
We can combine the estimated impact of state pre-K on kinder-
garten test scores, and the estimated impact of kindergarten scores 
on adult earnings, to predict how much these state pre-K programs 
increase adult earnings. These calculations suggest that state and local 
pre-K programs increase future adult earnings of children from low-
income families by 6 to 15 percent.23 
The study of Tulsa’s full-day pre-K program by Bartik,
Gormley, and Adelstein (2012) estimates test score effects that imply 
average adult earnings effects, for children from low-income fami-
lies, of 10 percent. A study of Boston’s full-day pre-K program by 
Weiland and Yoshikawa (2013) estimates test score effects that imply 
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Figure 2.1  How Test Scores of Tulsa Pre-K Entrants and Former Pre-K 
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average adult earnings effects, for children from low-income fami-
lies, of 15 percent.24 
SUMMARY OF THE EVIDENCE 
We have better evidence for the effectiveness of early childhood 
education than for almost any social or educational intervention. 
We have better evidence because we have good comparison groups. 
Ironically, these good comparison groups arise because early child-
hood education is not universal, so many children are excluded from 
services. 
Early childhood education has more evidence for effectiveness 
than most educational programs and practices. Consider the evidence 
for whether children benefit from going to third grade. No evidence 
from random assignment or natural experiments shows that children 
20 Bartik 
do any better from attending third grade rather than staying home. For 
third grade, we are unable to get good comparison groups, because 
everyone goes to third grade. 
But how do these adult earnings benefits for high-quality early 
childhood education compare with program costs? The next chapter 
considers this important issue. 


 
 
  
 
 
Chapter 3 
How Do the Adult Earnings 
Benefits of High-Quality 
Early Childhood Education 
Compare to Costs? 
As reviewed in Chapter 2, rigorous research shows that early child-
hood education can on average increase adult earnings for disadvan-
taged children by 3 to 26 percent. But are these earnings benefits 
greater than program costs? 
FUTURE EARNINGS VERSUS PRESENT COSTS 
To bring these ideas into focus, Figure 3.1 summarizes adult 
earnings benefits for three high-quality programs. The future adult 
earnings benefits reported for all three programs are for child partici-
pants from low-income families. A high-quality full-day pre-K pro-
gram, similar to Tulsa’s program, could increase average future adult 
earnings of such children by 10 percent.25 A high-quality full-time, 
full-year child care and pre-K program from birth to age five, simi-
lar to the Abecedarian/Educare programs, could increase the average 
future adult earnings of low-income children by 26 percent. A high-
quality home-visiting program to support parenting for children from 
low-income families, similar to the Nurse Family Partnership pro-
gram, could increase the average future adult earnings of participant 
children by 3 percent.26 
But costs must be considered. An Abecedarian/Educare program 
costs over $18,000 per year per child, or over $90,000 for the five 
years.27 One year of high-quality full-day pre-K at age four costs 
around $10,000.28 The Nurse Family Partnership costs $4,500 per 
23 
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Figure 3.1  Average Percentage Increase in Adult Earnings for Three 
Early Childhood Education Programs 
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child per year, or over $11,000 for the two-and-a-half years from the 
prenatal period until the child is age two.29 
To compare benefits with costs, both must be expressed in today’s 
dollars. The program costs are incurred today or in the next few years. 
The earnings benefits for former child participants are realized 15 to 
60 years in the future. We first correct for inflation and express future 
earnings in terms of today’s purchasing power. But even after that 
inflation correction, we must make a further correction, because a 
dollar today could be saved and invested and earn interest. There-
fore, a dollar today will be worth much more than a dollar 50 years 
from now, because of interest compounding over time. Economists do 
these adjustments by discounting future dollars down in value, using 
an appropriate interest rate, so that future dollars are equivalent to 
today’s dollars. This is referred to as calculating the “present value” 
of these future dollars. For example, even if there is no inflation, if 
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we discount future dollars at 3 percent per year, one dollar received 
50 years from now will have a “present value,” in today’s dollars, of 
only 23 cents. 
Comparing the present value of earnings benefits to costs for 
these three programs, full-day pre-K at age four for low-income chil-
dren has the highest ratio of adult earnings benefits to costs, at over 
5-to-1. The program increases the present value of future earnings 
per child by an average of slightly over $50,000, at a cost of around 
$10,000. Five years of Abecedarian/Educare has earnings benefits of 
over $130,000 per child. But the program’s costs are so high that the 
ratio of earnings benefits to costs is only 1.5-to-1. The Nurse Fam-
ily Partnership is cheaper, but also has lower benefits for the child’s 
future, resulting in a ratio of earnings benefits to costs of around 1.5-
to-1. Table 3.1 summarizes these calculations.30 
These ratios of earnings benefits to costs, ranging from 1.5-to-1 
up to more than 5-to-1, are typical of high-quality early childhood 
programs. This implies that to achieve very large percentage earnings 
effects on future earnings, the programs must make significant invest-
ments per child. For example, for a child age four from a disadvan-
taged family, the present value of that child’s future career earnings 
exceeds $500,000. A high-percentage increase in such a large number 
is a large benefit number in dollars, which will require large dollar 
costs if benefit-cost ratios do not typically exceed 6-to-1. 
Table 3.1  Per-Child Earnings Benefits versus Costs of Three Early 
Childhood Programs 
Full-day pre-K 
at age four Educare NFP 
Earnings benefits $53,000 $134,000 $16,000 
Program costs $10,000 $87,000 $11,000 
Ratio of benefits to costs 5.3 1.5 1.5 
NOTE: Benefits and costs are rounded to nearest thousand, in present-value 2012 dol-
lars. Present value is calculated at age four for pre-K, at birth for Educare/NFP. All 
benefits and costs are average effects per child participant. 
SOURCE: Author’s calculations based on research, as described in text and endnotes. 
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These calculations also imply that an early childhood program 
may pass a benefit-cost test even if its percentage effects on future 
earnings are modest. Even 2 percent of a half-million dollars in future 
earnings is a large benefit. 
PARENTAL EARNINGS 
In addition to earnings benefits for former child participants, some 
early childhood programs significantly boost the earnings of parents. 
Child care programs allow parents to work or go to school, which 
boosts earnings both in the short run and the long run. Some parenting 
programs, such as the Nurse Family Partnership, help change the life 
course of parents—for example, through encouraging job training, 
which may boost earnings. 
For the Abecedarian program, parental earnings benefits have a 
present value of over 150 percent of the large earnings benefits for 
children. For the Nurse Family Partnership, parental earnings benefits 
have a present value that is equal to the present value of earnings 
benefits for children (Bartik 2011). For these two programs, including 
parental earnings roughly doubles the benefit-cost ratios in Table 3.1. 
In contrast, just providing pre-K full-time during the school year 
at age four does not provide much of a direct earnings boost for par-
ents.31 Pre-K needs to cover more hours, a greater part of the year, and 
more years to significantly boost parental earnings prospects. 
ARE THESE EFFECTS LARGE? 
Early childhood education programs can increase adult earnings 
of child participants by 26 percent (Educare), 10 percent (full-day 
pre-K), or 3 percent (Nurse Family Partnership). A skeptic might 
admit that 26 percent is large, or even 10 percent, but is 3 percent 
really a large effect? The answer is “yes,” for several reasons. First, 
most of us would welcome a 3 percent lifetime gain in our standard 
of living. Second, this percentage earnings effect is averaged over all 
program participants. Behind this average is a diversity of earnings 
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gains for different individuals. Many have little or no gain from the 
program; others have much larger earnings gains. 
How do we tell whether these large earnings gains for some for-
mer child participants are worth investing in the program? By com-
paring benefits with costs. These programs have a good economic 
payoff in that benefits significantly exceed costs. Early childhood 
programs do not solve all problems for all program participants. But 
early childhood programs do enough good for a sufficient number 
of child participants that they make economic sense. Added to these 
benefits for former child participants are social benefits for others, as 
discussed in Chapter 6. 
CLOSING COMMENTS 
These calculations of earnings-benefits-to-costs ratios assume 
that the research in Chapter 2 is valid. This research has been criti-
cized, as is discussed in the next chapter. 

  
 
 
 
  
Chapter 4 
Criticisms of the Research Evidence 
The research evidence for early childhood education has been ques-
tioned by critics, including the Wall Street Journal editorial page, 
Russ Whitehurst of the Brookings Institution, Charles Murray of the 
American Enterprise Institute, and Shikha Dalmia and Lisa Snell of 
the Reason Foundation. These criticisms have been repeated in news 
coverage by FactCheck.org and National Public Radio. 
These critics raise the following issues: 
 The evidence for early childhood education is argued to 
be based on small experiments conducted a long time ago 
by researchers; therefore, critics contend, we don’t know 
whether early childhood education will work if run today at 
a large scale by ordinary public agencies. 
 The recent Head Start experiment is argued to show that test 
score benefits of pre-K fade to statistical insignificance by 
third grade. 
 Data from Oklahoma and Georgia are used to argue that uni-
versal pre-K fails to significantly improve test scores or other 
social indicators. 
 A random assignment study of Tennessee’s pre-K program 
is used to argue against the effectiveness of state and local 
pre-K programs. 
These criticisms are overblown. As argued below, none of these 
criticisms successfully challenge the research consensus: High-
quality early childhood education works. 
CRITICISM 1: The evidence for early childhood education’s 
benefits only comes from small and expensive experiments run a 
long time ago. 
29 
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Critics acknowledge that evidence for early childhood education 
is provided by the Perry and Abecedarian experiments. But this evi-
dence is argued to be irrelevant to policy today:32 
Costs per participant for Perry and Abecedarian were multiples 
of the levels of investment in present-day state preschool pro-
grams. (Whitehurst 2013b)33 
[A] nationwide expansion of early education . . . won’t have 
the highly motivated administrators and hand-picked staffs that 
demonstration projects enjoy. (Murray 2013)34 
The circumstances of the very poor families of the Black chil-
dren who were served by these model programs 30 to 40 years 
ago are very different from those faced by the families that are 
presently served by publicly funded preschool programs. . . . 
[Forty] years ago other government supports for low-income 
families were at much lower levels and pre-K was not widely 
available for anyone. (Whitehurst 2013b)35 
However, the research evidence for early childhood education 
encompasses more than Perry and Abecedarian. Evidence comes from 
more recent studies of large-scale programs with more modest costs. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, many large-scale state and local pre-K 
programs have strong effects on short-run test scores; such effects 
predict sizable long-run earnings benefits. The Chicago Child-Parent 
Center studies provide direct evidence of long-run benefits. CPC was 
a large-scale program, with similar costs per child to many state and 
local pre-K programs. 
More recent programs have smaller earnings benefits than Perry 
and Abecedarian. CPC has average earnings effects of 8 percent, and 
many state and local pre-K programs have effects from 6 to 10 per-
cent, whereas Perry had earnings effects of 19 percent and Abecedar-
ian had earnings effects of 26 percent. But because costs are lower, 
the benefit-cost ratio for recent pre-K programs is still strong. As 
Chapter 3 showed, a full-day pre-K program might have a ratio of 
earnings benefits to costs of over 5-to-1, whereas Abecedarian’s high 
costs lead to a lower ratio of earnings benefits to costs of 1.5-to-1. 
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Today’s pre-K programs are run at a large scale by state agencies 
and local public schools, not by expert researchers who handpick a 
few great teachers. For example, the public schools in Tulsa, Boston, 
and Chicago all run successful pre-K programs. 
The presence of competing programs complicates benefit-cost 
analyses. If a new pre-K program substitutes for existing programs, 
this reduces the new program’s net earnings benefits. But net costs 
of the new program are also reduced, because it reduces spending 
on existing programs. The ratio of benefits to costs need not decline. 
Fewer of these recent evaluations are random assignment experi-
ments. Random assignment experiments are expensive, and they are 
difficult to set up for a large-scale program. Such experiments will 
always be rare and will tend to be small-scale. But, as argued in Chap-
ter 2, these recent evaluations are reliable because they have good 
comparison groups, chosen by natural experiments. 
The recent studies look at test score effects in the short term, 
not directly at adult earnings effects. Benefits for adult earnings are 
inferred from test score effects. But this is inevitable if one wants 
timely evaluations of recent programs. 
Finally, the Perry and Abecedarian evidence is still relevant to cur-
rent policy issues. Today’s Educare program is similar to Abecedarian. 
Today’s pre-K programs have many similarities to Perry. Today’s pro-
grams do have larger class sizes than Perry, and they usually only last 
one year rather than Perry’s two years. On the other hand, Perry was a 
half-day program, whereas many current pre-K programs are full-day. 
All in all, Abecedarian and Perry are similar enough to today’s pro-
grams to provide useful information for current policy.
CRITICISM 2: Early childhood education is argued to be inef-
fective because the recent Head Start experiment has test score 
effects that quickly faded to statistical insignificance. 
Critics have argued that the recent random assignment experi-
ment on Head Start trumps other research evidence and shows that 
large-scale early childhood education is ineffective: 
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The Head Start Impact Study is a randomized controlled trial, 
the gold-standard for evaluating the effectiveness of social and 
health programs. . . . The findings . . . are that there were effects 
favoring Head Start children on some outcome variables at the 
end of the Head Start year. However, these impacts did not per-
sist. Both in the kindergarten and first grade follow-up data . . . ,
and the third grade follow-up data, . . . there were no reliable 
differences in outcomes for children who won the lottery to 
attend Head Start vs. those who lost that lottery and served as 
the control group. (Whitehurst 2013a) 
Head Start’s impact is no better than random. (Wall Street Jour-
nal, editorial published on February 27, 2013).36 
These criticisms are based on the Head Start experiment’s finding 
that estimated effects decline by third grade so that they are insigni-
ficantly different from zero. Based on literacy and math tests admin-
istered both at the end of Head Start and the end of third grade, the 
effects of Head Start decline by over 70 percent. The point estimate 
of test score effects at the end of third grade still predicts that Head 
Start will increase lifetime earnings by 1.2 percent, which is a lot of 
money over a career. But because of statistical uncertainty, we cannot 
reject that the true effect is zero or negative. The true effect could also 
be three times as great. However, if one begins with a skeptical atti-
tude that the true effect is zero until proven otherwise, then the Head 
Start results at Grade Three do not overcome that skepticism.37 If the 
Head Start random assignment experiment was the only evidence on 
the effects of early childhood education, skepticism about these pro-
grams’ effectiveness would be warranted. 
However, many early childhood programs have fading test score 
impacts, but still significantly improve adult outcomes. As shown in 
Chapter 2, test score fading occurs not only in Head Start, but in many 
early childhood programs, including Perry Preschool, the Abecedar-
ian Project, and the Chicago Child-Parent Center Program. Despite 
this test score fading, adult earnings effects reemerge. The initial test 
score effects are better predictions of adult earnings effects than the 
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faded test score effects. Figure 4.1 illustrates the evidence for these 
four programs (Head Start, Perry, Abecedarian, CPC).38 
This fading and reemergence of effects could be due to non-
cognitive skills, which are important to adult earnings but harder to 
measure using standardized tests. Social skills and character skills 
are at least as important as cognitive skills in making a worker more 
employable and more productive. Worker employability and produc-
tivity will depend upon social skills such as how a worker relates 
to supervisors, coworkers, and customers, and upon character skills 
such as reliability in showing up at work on time and being persistent 
in finishing work assignments. Cognitive skills also matter to adult 
earnings, but these cognitive skills must be applied effectively, which 
depends on character skills and social skills. 
Figure 4.1  Predicted Percentage Effects on Adult Earnings of Early 
Childhood Programs, Based on Test Scores versus Adult 
Outcomes 
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Pre-K can get children off to a good start by developing basic 
cognitive skills, social skills, and character skills. Over time, these 
skills build on themselves. If a child has better cognitive skills, 
social skills, and character skills at kindergarten entrance, that child 
will learn more in kindergarten and will develop still more self-
confidence, ability to learn, and ability to operate socially in school. 
And so on in first grade and higher grades—at each grade, the skills 
built in previous grades lead to additional learning. By third grade, 
the boost to skills provided by pre-K is inadequately measured by 
standardized tests, as much of the boost comes from social and char-
acter skills that are harder to measure. But the initial boost to cogni-
tive skills at kindergarten entrance is a catalyst that leads to these 
broader skills, by increasing self-confidence and the ability to learn. 
The important catalytic role of cognitive skills is why the end-of-
program test score gain helps predict adult earnings. 
Another important point is that the recent Head Start experiment 
may not represent the effectiveness of the best pre-K programs, Head 
Start in the past, or Head Start compared to no pre-K. Several stud-
ies show that initial test score effects of Head Start are one-half to 
two-thirds of some other pre-K programs.39 Furthermore, the recent 
Head Start experiment’s results are unusual in the rapidity of fade-
out, compared both to other pre-K programs and to Head Start in the 
past. For example, Deming (2009) found little fading of Head Start’s 
initial effects in elementary school, with more fading occurring in 
middle school.40 
A possible explanation is that the Head Start experiment does 
not compare Head Start with no pre-K; it compares a treatment group 
offered enrollment in Head Start with a control group that was sup-
posed to be denied admission to Head Start but often attended some 
pre-K program. Only 80 percent of the treatment group enrolled in 
Head Start. About half of the control group attended some pre-K pro-
gram, including 14 percent in Head Start and 35 percent in some other 
pre-K program (Puma et al. 2012, p. xix; U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services 2010). If these other pre-K programs were more 
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effective than Head Start, the experiment’s net impact would be 
reduced. 
In recent years, Head Start has faced more competition. Studies 
showing long-run benefits of Head Start are necessarily examining 
Head Start in the past, when low-income families had fewer high-
quality alternatives. In recent years, increased availability of state 
pre-K means that Head Start needs to up its quality to justify its higher 
costs. But today’s lower net Head Start impacts need not imply that 
high-quality pre-K makes no difference compared to no pre-K. 
Recent Head Start reforms may have increased quality, compared 
to Head Start at the time of the experiment (2002–2003). From 2003 
to 2006, more literacy instruction was pushed in Head Start. Research 
suggests that Head Start children gained more in literacy in 2006 and 
2009 than was true in 2003 (Barnett 2013). 
CRITICISM 3: Why haven’t Oklahoma and Georgia, two states 
that have prominently adopted universal pre-K, been more 
obviously successful in improving test scores and other social 
indicators? 
Pre-K advocates have sometimes pointed to Oklahoma and Geor-
gia as models (Lerner 2012; Obama 2013). These states were early 
adopters of broader pre-K access (Georgia in 1995, Oklahoma in 
1998), and have moved a long way toward universal access. (Okla-
homa has 74 percent of all four-year-olds in its state program; Geor-
gia has 58 percent [Barnett et al. 2013].) Oklahoma’s program meets 
high-quality standards (Barnett et al.) and has received favorable 
evaluations (Wong et al. 2008). (Georgia’s pre-K program has more 
mixed reviews.) 
But, critics argue, if broad access to pre-K is so great, why haven’t 
Oklahoma and Georgia made more progress? Shikha Dalmia and Lisa 
Snell of the Reason Foundation hold that “neither state program has 
demonstrated major social benefits. . . . The average NAEP reading 
score for Oklahoma fourth-graders dropped four points between 1998 
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and 2011—although it went up nine points for Georgia. . . . Oklahoma 
remains below the national average and Georgia has just reached the 
national average” (Dalmia and Snell 2013). 
The Wall Street Journal editorial board quotes President Obama, 
from a Georgia speech promoting federal support for preschool, as 
saying that “education has to start at the earliest possible age. . . . If 
you are looking for a good bang for your educational buck, this is it 
right here.” The Journal goes on to assert that “Mr. Obama is right 
that the state is a good example of what universal pre-K can buy. 
Georgia’s fourth- and eighth-grade reading, math and science scores 
all trail the national average” (Wall Street Journal 2013). 
Both pre-K critics and advocates need to recognize that analysis 
of test scores in just one or two states is subject to great uncertainty. 
Because average state test scores are frequently buffeted by demo-
graphic or economic changes, detecting the influence of any policy 
on test scores in one or two states is statistically difficult. Even if a 
state’s pre-K program improves test scores enough to predict large 
long-term benefits, these improvements can easily be masked by 
other influences. 
Part of the empirical challenge is that even slight improvements 
in test scores are sufficient to predict large economic gains. A two per-
centile gain in average elementary school test scores—moving from 
the 50th to the 52nd percentile on a standardized test—is enough to 
predict that future adult earnings will increase by 1 percent (Chetty et 
al. 2011). For the average American worker, career earnings exceed 
$1.5 million.41 A 1 percent boost would increase career earnings by 
over $15,000, a large benefit. Demographic and economic changes 
can easily affect test scores by more than two percentiles. Because of 
this statistical “noise” in a state’s average test scores, it is hard for an 
examination of one state’s test scores to rule out test score increases 
that would be meaningful economically.42 
A good recent study of pre-K in Oklahoma and Georgia tries to 
minimize this uncertainty by combining many years of data (Cascio 
and Schanzenbach 2013). This study estimates average state test 
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score effects that predict that benefits exceed costs by at least 3-to-
1.43 However, because of the statistical noise inherent in focusing on 
test score effects in just two states, these estimated test score effects 
are not statistically significantly different from zero at conventional 
levels of significance used by researchers.44 
People love anecdotes. We are tempted to believe that the truth 
can be discovered by the examples of one or two states. But this is dif-
ficult to do. If states are laboratories of democracy, this lab gets much 
more precise results with many “test subjects” (states), rather than 
with just one or two states as test subjects. An alternative way to get 
the larger numbers needed for statistical precision is to compare many 
individuals, some of whom participated in early childhood education 
versus similar nonparticipants. 
CRITICISM 4: The recent Tennessee pre-K experiment shows 
that test score effects quickly fade, which raises questions about 
whether state pre-K programs are effective. 
A recent random-assignment experimental study of Tennessee’s 
pre-K program found some effects at the end of pre-K, but effects 
faded by the end of kindergarten or the end of first grade (Lipsey et
al. 2013a,b). According to one critic, 
I see these findings as devastating for advocates of the expan-
sion of state pre-K programs. This is the first large scale ran-
domized trial of a present-day state pre-K program. Its method-
ology soundly trumps the quasi-experimental approaches that 
have heretofore been the only source of data on which to infer 
the impact of these programs. . . . The most defensible conclu-
sion is that these statewide programs are not working to mean-
ingfully increase the academic achievement or social/emotional 
skills and dispositions of children from low-income families.
(Whitehurst 2013c) 
One problem with the Tennessee study is its considerable sample 
attrition, which may lead to bias. In the first cohort of children, the 
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Tennessee study only obtained parental consent to have tests admin-
istered to the children for 46 percent of the pre-K participants and 
for 32 percent of the control group. For the sample with test data, the 
treatment and control groups may differ greatly in unobserved char-
acteristics, particularly since the attrition differs so much in the two 
groups. Any test score differences between the two groups will be due 
to some combination of true effects of the pre-K program and bias due 
to unobserved characteristics. The Tennessee researchers do a good 
job of minimizing biases by controlling for the child’s and family’s 
observed characteristics. But such controls cannot adjust for biases 
due to unobserved characteristics.45 
Because of these problems, the Tennessee study does not trump 
other studies of state and local pre-K programs. As discussed in Chap-
ter 2, these other studies try to estimate effects of pre-K by natural 
experiments in which pre-K access varies because of where a fam-
ily lives or a child’s age. The argument is that such natural variation 
in pre-K access will cause the treatment and comparison groups to 
be similar in unobserved characteristics. While a random assignment 
study with few problems may be superior to natural experiments, a 
random assignment study with sizable attrition cannot claim such 
superiority. 
Another important point is that Tennessee’s pre-K program is not 
as high-quality as other state and local pre-K programs. For example, 
Tennessee spends a little under $6,000 per child annually for a full-
day pre-K program. According to Barnett et al. (2013), Tennessee 
would have to spend at least $2,000 extra per child to consistently 
deliver quality.46 In contrast, pre-K programs such as those in Tulsa, 
Chicago, and Boston all pay amounts per child that equal or exceed 
guidelines for the funding necessary to reach quality standards. Even 
if Tennessee’s program is ineffective, this need not imply the ineffec-
tiveness of state and local pre-K programs of better quality. 
One study of one state’s program rarely trumps all other studies. 
Any single study has limitations, which is why policy should be based 
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on many studies. The case for early childhood education is that high-
quality programs work, not that all programs work. 
CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
A persistent theme in these criticisms is that the effective-
ness of early childhood education is uncertain. Uncertainty argues 
for postponing action until we know more. Russ Whitehurst of 
Brookings makes precisely this argument in discussing the Tennes-
see results: “Maybe we should figure out how to deliver effective 
programs before the federal government funds preschool for all”
(Whitehurst 2013c). But, as this book will discuss in Chapter 5, we do 
know something about how to deliver effective programs. 

  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 5 
How Can Early Childhood 
Education Programs 
Best Be Designed? 
Early childhood programs can have benefits that exceed costs. But 
how does this benefit-cost ratio vary with program design, such as 
 quality of teacher-child interactions; 
 class size and teacher credentials and salaries; 
 whether the program serves only low-income children, or 
also serves middle-class children; 
 program duration (two years versus one year of pre-K; full-
day versus half-day pre-K); and 
 earlier versus later interventions—for example, programs at 
ages one and two versus at ages three and four. 
QUALITY OF TEACHER-CHILD INTERACTIONS 
An unsurprising research finding is that the effectiveness of early 
childhood education depends on the quality of teacher-child inter-
actions. If teacher-child interactions are better, children make more 
progress in early childhood programs (Mashburn et al. 2008; Sabol 
et al. 2013).47 
Better-quality teacher-child interactions include better instruc-
tional support—for example, the teacher posing thought-provoking 
questions to children and providing meaningful feedback. Better-
quality interactions also include good classroom management and 
positive emotional support. The quality of teacher-child interactions 
can be measured using trained observers who rate what is going on 
41 
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in a pre-K classroom at various times during the day (LaParo, Pianta, 
and Stuhlman 2004). 
Better-quality teacher-child interactions are correlated with learn-
ing gains that are meaningful economically. One study divided pre-K 
classrooms into four levels of quality based on teacher-child interac-
tions. The differences in test-score gains between the highest-quality 
and lowest-quality classrooms predict future earnings differences of 
6 percent.48 
Such adult earnings gains sum to large earnings benefits for an 
entire classroom. Suppose we consider a pre-K classroom that has 15 
children, all from disadvantaged families. Then, a 6 percent average 
boost to adult earnings for 15 children would have a present value 
of slightly less than one-half million dollars.49 If we could sustain 
this classroom improvement, then each year would yield another half-
million dollars in increased future earnings. 
This comparison is for improving pre-K classrooms from the 
lowest- to the highest-quality level. Evidence suggests that quality 
improvements have increasing effects at higher-quality levels. But 
even more modest-quality increases can have benefits per classroom 
cohort of over $100,000.50 
Large costs are justified to improve the average quality of early 
childhood education by a moderate amount. When multiplied by an 
entire future for a child, and many children in each classroom, and 
potentially many years if the program can sustain the higher quality, 
even modest improvements in average quality have large payoffs. 
CLASS SIZE AND TEACHER CREDENTIALS 
A more controversial issue among researchers is how early 
childhood education’s effectiveness is altered by “structural qual-
ity.” “Structural quality” means program features such as class size 
and teacher credentials and salaries. These features of the program’s 
“structure” can easily be set by program rules and funding. 
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Structural quality makes a difference in some studies, but not 
in others.51 Structural quality is not assigned randomly or by natural 
experiment, so these studies may be biased by unobserved child and 
family characteristics. In contrast, a random assignment experiment 
shows that the Nurse Family Partnership yields better outcomes if 
services are provided by nurses, rather than paraprofessionals (Olds 
et al. 2004). 
Despite this mixed research, it seems prudent for policymakers to 
assume that smaller class sizes and stronger teacher credentials will 
facilitate greater program effectiveness. One rationale for this policy 
advice is that it seems plausible: Better teacher-child interactions 
are probably easier to attain if the class size is more modest and the 
teacher is better trained. 
Second, some of the best pre-K programs with favorable evalua-
tions used certified teachers and had moderate class sizes. This is true 
for Perry, Abecedarian, Chicago CPC, and some good local pre-K 
programs, including Tulsa and Boston.52 Lowering quality standards 
too much from these models increases the risk of lower effectiveness. 
Third, only modest increases in effectiveness are needed for 
smaller class sizes and stronger teacher credentials to have future 
earnings benefits that exceed costs. Suppose for a pre-K program we 
increased the lead teacher credential requirement from only requiring 
a Child Development Associate (CDA) credential to requiring a certi-
fied teacher with a BA who is paid a public school wage. For a class 
size of 15 children and two teachers, this increased credential require-
ment increases the cost per child of a full-day (six-hour) school-year 
pre-K program by about one-third, from around $7,500 to around 
$10,000. But these increased costs would be justified by higher earn-
ings benefits if such a change only increased average future adult 
earnings by one-half of 1 percent. Only a small percentage earnings 
increase is needed, because expected future career earnings are so 
large, even for disadvantaged children, averaging over one-half mil-
lion dollars in present value. This earnings increase would be pre-
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dicted to occur if average end-of-program test scores increased by 
two-thirds of one percentile—for example, moving a student from the 
median (50th percentile) to the 50.67th percentile (test scores greater 
than 50.67 percent of all students).53 
Lowering class size in a full-day pre-K program from 20 stu-
dents to 15 students would increase the costs per child from $8,300 
to $10,000. This would have earnings benefits greater than costs if it 
increased adult earnings by only 0.3 percent. This would be predicted 
to occur if end-of-program test scores increased by one-half of one 
percentile.54 
Suppose that lowering class size in pre-K was as effective in 
raising test scores as it is in grades K–3. Suppose also that we base 
this extrapolation to pre-K on a random assignment experiment, the 
Tennessee Class Size Study, which looked at lowering class size in 
kindergarten through third grade. If the Tennessee results are extrapo-
lated to pre-K, lowering pre-K class size from 20 to 15 children would 
increase future adult earnings by 30 percent.55 
The mixed research findings on class size and teacher credentials 
may be due to how these policies interact with other quality deter-
minants. Mandating lower pre-K class sizes may make it more dif-
ficult to afford adequate teacher salaries. Lower salaries will increase 
teacher turnover, which may hurt pre-K quality. Higher teacher cre-
dential requirements without increases in pre-K teacher wages may 
also increase teacher turnover. Policymakers need to consider how the 
combined features of program design affect quality. 
MIDDLE-CLASS CHILDREN 
Research suggests that middle-class children’s benefits from early 
childhood education vary by program type. For pre-K, benefits occur 
for a wide variety of income groups. For child care and parenting 
programs, benefits are limited to children from low-income families. 
Across children from families with different income, pre-K has 
similar effects on improving a child’s test score percentile at kinder-
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garten entrance. In both Tulsa’s and Boston’s universal pre-K pro-
grams, children eligible for a lunch subsidy have greater test-score 
percentile gains than children whose family income is too high for 
a lunch subsidy, but the advantage is slight and usually statistically 
insignificant.56 
Increases in kindergarten test scores by a given percentile pre-
dict a similar dollar gain in adult earnings (Chetty et al. 2011). Say 
test scores increase by one percentile. Whether that one percentile 
is gained from the 20th to the 21st percentile or from the 70th to the 
71st percentile doesn’t matter—in either case, it would result in a very 
similar amount of dollars being added to future adult annual earnings. 
Therefore, Tulsa or Boston pre-K participants from different income 
groups would be predicted to have similar future dollar gains in adult 
earnings. 
Why are earnings effects of pre-K similar across income groups? 
Quality pre-K provides services that are difficult for even the best par-
ent with the most resources to reproduce on his or her own. Quality 
pre-K provides opportunities to learn to get along with peers and with 
authority figures such as teachers. Quality pre-K provides peer pres-
sure and teacher help in learning cognitive skills. This child-centered 
learning is hard for most parents to provide completely with their own 
resources. 
Some parents may have sufficient resources to purchase quality 
pre-K on their own. But quality pre-K is expensive—costing, as men-
tioned, $10,000 for a full-day (six hours per day) school-year pro-
gram. Costs are even higher if we add in wraparound hours for the 
rest of the workday, and for the rest of the year, or if we consider 
adding in a second year of pre-K. 
Such expensive services are difficult for most families to afford 
on their own. Many middle-class as well as low-income families will 
find it challenging to pay for quality pre-K on their own dime. 
A high proportion of American children under the age of five 
live in families with modest resources. Based on data from the Cur-
rent Population Survey, of children under the age of five, about one-
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quarter are in families below the poverty line, and almost half (47 
percent) are below 200 percent of the poverty line. Even if pre-K was 
needed only for children from poor and near-poor families, full-scale 
pre-K would need to serve half of all American children. But many 
children from families above 200 percent of the poverty line will also 
benefit from public funding for quality pre-K. These working-class 
and middle-class families find that publicly funded pre-K can provide 
an educational opportunity for their child that the family could not 
readily match. 
Even though high-quality pre-K provides similar dollar benefits 
to children from low-income and middle-class families, universal 
pre-K would still help even out economic opportunities. Expected 
baseline future earnings—earnings without pre-K—would be much 
lower for the average child from a lower-income family, compared to 
one from a middle-income family. Similar dollar benefits for children 
from lower-income and middle-income families imply much larger 
percentage effects on future earnings prospects for children from 
lower-income families. 
Table 5.1 shows a simulation of how pre-K benefits vary across 
income groups.57 Even though pre-K’s dollar benefits for future adult 
earnings of middle-class children are nine-tenths of the dollar ben-
efits for lower-income children, the percentage boost to earnings for 
lower-income children is twice that for middle-class children (10 per-
cent versus 5 percent). 
In contrast, effects of developmental child care programs or 
parenting programs appear to be limited to low-income families. 
Consider the Infant Health and Development Program mentioned 
in Chapter 2. IHDP provided child care services for children at ages 
one and two that were similar to the Abecedarian/Educare programs. 
Duncan and Sojourner (2013) find large and statistically significant 
effects of this program on children whose family income was below 
180 percent of the poverty line, but not for children from families 
above that income level. 
    
 
How Can Early Childhood Programs Best Be Designed? 47 
Table 5.1 How Earnings Benefits of Pre-K per Child Vary for Children 
from Different Income Groups 
Earnings gains versus baseline 
earnings for a child from a 
Low-income family Middle-income family 
Gains from pre-K $53,000 $48,000 
Baseline earnings $547,000 $997,000 
Percentage gain 10% 5% 
NOTE: Gains and baseline earnings are rounded to the nearest thousand, in present-
value 2012 dollars. Baseline earnings are the present value of total career earnings 
without pre-K. Earnings and gains are averages per child for program participants. 
SOURCE: Author’s calculations, as described in text and endnotes. 
Effects of high-quality child care might be income-targeted 
because there are big differences across different-income families in 
what the high-quality child care is substituting for. The high-quality 
child care for lower-income families may be substituting for either 
parental or relative care by parents and relatives who may be over-
stressed by poverty. Alternatively, the high-quality child care may be 
substituting for the very-low-quality child care the family can afford 
on its own. For middle-income families, even high-quality child care 
is substituting for parental or relative care by families that have fewer 
stressors and more resources, or for better-quality child care that a 
middle-income family can afford on its own. It is more difficult for a 
high-quality child care program to surpass what a middle-class family 
can provide on its own in child care at ages one and two. 
Similar findings occur for parenting programs. For the Nurse 
Family Partnership, the research suggests that this program had 
greater effects for more disadvantaged women (Olds et al. 1997). 
On average, middle-income families may have more resources 
and support to provide high-quality parenting on their own. On aver-
age, low-income families may be more likely to have fewer social 
supports and resources. Parenting programs might provide a valuable 
supplement. 
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PROGRAM DURATION 
There are some signs of diminishing returns to duration for pre-K 
programs. A full-day pre-K program seems to have effects that are 
one-half to two-thirds greater than a half-day program, rather than 
the doubled effects one might expect. In Tulsa, half-day pre-K is 
predicted to increase future earnings of the children with the lowest 
income by 6 percent, whereas a full-day program yields an increase 
of 10 percent for the same income group.58 
Two years of pre-K does not double benefits. The estimates from 
the Chicago Child-Parent Center Program suggest that children who 
participated for two years, at both ages three and four, gained about 
50 percent more in earnings than children who participated only at 
age four.59 
Diminishing returns may occur for several reasons. First, pre-K 
for some children is making up for major skill deficiencies. Once a 
major skill deficiency is addressed sufficiently, it cannot be overcome 
again. Second, many children may only be able to learn a certain 
amount per day. Third, adding a second year may have diminishing 
returns if the pre-K curriculum cannot assume that all participants at 
age four have already participated at age three. 
Despite these diminishing returns, moving from a half day to a 
full day, or from one year of pre-K to two years, probably passes a 
benefit-cost test. If one year of pre-K has future earnings benefits that 
are five times the costs, as shown in Chapter 3, then even earnings 
benefits of half as much for a second year will still be double the 
additional costs. For half-day versus full-day pre-K, similar simula-
tions suggest added earnings benefits of four times the added costs 
for full-day.60 
For full-day versus half-day pre-K, a full-day program makes it 
easier and more attractive for many parents to access the program. 
It is cheaper for parents to add on wraparound child care to turn a 
full-day pre-K program into a full child-care program. Added access 
increases benefits. 
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EARLIER VERSUS LATER INTERVENTIONS 
How about returns to early childhood education programs at dif-
ferent ages? On average, many pre-K programs appear to have ben-
efits for children’s future earnings, compared to costs, that are greater 
than earnings-benefits-to-cost ratios for earlier-age child care or par-
enting programs. 
This was apparent in Chapter 3, which found an earnings-benefits-
to-costs ratio for full-day pre-K of over 5-to-1, versus earnings-
benefits-to-costs ratios of 1.5-to-1 for Abecedarian/Educare and the 
Nurse Family Partnership. Similar findings were reported in a research 
review by Reynolds, Temple, and Ou (2010): “Although programs at 
all ages show evidence of positive economic returns exceeding $1 
per dollar invested, preschool programs for three- and four-year-olds 
generally show the highest returns” (p. 181).61 
For child care programs, the issue is high program costs per child. 
Abecedarian/Educare is predicted to increase the child’s future earn-
ings by 26 percent. But five years of full-time child care from six 
weeks after birth to age five has gross costs of $18,000 per year, or 
$90,000 in total. 
A child care program has a hard time being as cost-efficient as a 
pre-K program. Child care programs have to operate with low ratios 
of children to caregivers to be high-quality. Pre-K programs can be 
high-quality with child-to-teacher ratios of 15-to-2, 17-to-2, or even 
20-to-2, which obviously are infeasible for quality child care at ages 
one and two. 
For parenting programs, the problem is that a good parenting pro-
gram costs as much per child as a good pre-K program, but directly 
involves the child for fewer hours. A good parenting program requires 
frequent individual home visits. For example, the NFP includes around 
30 individual home visits over two-and-a-half years at 90 minutes per 
visit. The total amount of time is about 45 hours of one-on-one atten-
tion. The idea of the program is that these individual home visits will 
  
50 Bartik 
transform parenting practices. And these programs work: The NFP
increases the child’s future earnings by around 3 percent on average. 
In contrast, even a half-day, one-school-year pre-K program will 
involve the child directly for about 500 hours (three hours per day 
times 180 school days = 540 hours). A full-day program would be 
over 1,000 hours. 
But the Nurse Family Partnership costs about $11,000 per child 
over that two-and-a-half-year period. Even a full-day pre-K program 
only costs about $10,000 per child. The reason for the cost differential 
is that the NFP requires so much one-on-one time with each indi-
vidual parent by a skilled professional nurse. Pre-K serves children in 
groups, which from a cost perspective is more efficient. 
A child’s brain may be more malleable at ages zero, one, and two 
than at ages three and four. But the interventions at earlier ages have 
to be more one-on-one or in very small groups, which is expensive. 
In addition, these interventions substitute for what parents do on their 
own at these ages, which in many cases will be more than adequate. In 
contrast, pre-K interventions at ages three and four can be done suc-
cessfully in larger groups, and they provide learning in social skills 
that children are ready for and can more easily get in a pre-K setting 
than on their own. 
Pre-K services at ages three and four target an age range that is 
a “sweet spot”: the child’s brain is still malleable enough for mod-
est interventions to have large long-run effects, but the child is old 
enough that the child is ready to learn in larger groups that are cost-
effective to run. From a benefit-cost perspective, ages three and four 
offer the largest returns for a child’s development per dollar spent. 
Having said that, if we’re trying to maximize our effects on each 
child’s development, there are benefits to adding developmental child 
care and parenting programs for low-income children to the program 
mix. Pre-K is unlikely to increase lower-income children’s future 
earnings by 26 percent, which an Abecedarian/Educare program can 
do. Parenting programs can add additional future earnings effects of 
3 percent or more. These benefits to children’s future earnings exceed 
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the added costs of these program additions. And these program addi-
tions have benefits for parents that also should be considered. 
A sensible proposal would be universal pre-K, along with 
income-targeted parenting programs and developmental child care. 
Such a proposal is described in Chapter 7. 
First, however, I broaden the perspective on benefits. So far, the 
analysis has focused on the benefits of early childhood education for 
former child participants and their families. But are there broader 
social benefits? Chapter 6 considers this question. 

 Chapter 6 
Spillover Benefits 
How Does Early Childhood Education 
Affect Other Groups Than Those Families 
Directly Served by These Programs? 
So far, this book has focused on how early childhood education 
benefits child participants or their parents. But what about the rest of 
society? 
If I think my children will be OK without government interven-
tion in early childhood education, why should I be willing to pay 
increased taxes for early childhood education to help “other people’s 
children”? Altruism is one reason, but is there also an argument to be 
made based on enlightened self-interest? 
Yes, there is: When some children get more skills, this has large 
spillover benefits for the rest of society. The most important spill-
over benefits, in my view, are the productivity benefits for the entire 
economy. Other spillover benefits include peer effects in education, 
lower crime, short-term and long-term fiscal benefits, and long-term 
benefits for the next generation. 
SKILL SPILLOVERS 
Some people picture the economy as having a fixed number of 
good jobs. If my children don’t need government help for early child-
hood education, then I might think that expanding early childhood 
education harms my children’s prospects.62 It’s more competition for 
the fixed number of good jobs. 
But that’s not how the economy works. The empirical evidence 
suggests that when skills of one group increase, this enhances overall 
wages of most workers. The underlying reason is that the number of 
53 
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good jobs is not fixed. Good jobs will expand in response to the sup-
ply of persons with good skills. 
For example, studies by Ernesto Moretti and others have shown 
sizable positive effects of an increase in the college graduation per-
centage in a metro economy on the metro area’s wages (Diamond 
2013; Moretti 2003, 2004, 2012). My wages depend not only on 
whether I have a college degree, but also on what percentage of oth-
ers in the local economy have a college degree. 
Suppose we use these results to project the wage effects if a metro 
area has a 1 percent increase in the percentage of workers with a col-
lege degree. As shown in Figure 6.1, the direct effect on metro-area 
average wages would be an increase of 0.8 percent. College gradu-
ates on average earn 80 percent more than non–college graduates. 
Multiplying 80 percent by 1 percent yields a 0.8 percent increase in 
average wages. 
But the estimated spillover effects of the college graduation per-
centage on others’ wages imply that average wages for others in the 
economy will go up by 1.1 percent. The total wage increase will be 
1.9 percent. The sum of the spillover effects is actually larger than the 
direct wage effect of increasing college graduates. 
For any individual, the spillover effect is small. If I get a college 
degree, my expected earnings go up by 80 percent, which will add 
about $1.2 million to my income over an entire career.63 The impact of 
this on any one individual fellow metro resident is small. But the spill-
over impact summed over the many other workers in the metro area 
is $1.7 million, slightly more than the direct effect on my earnings.64 
Most workers in a local economy benefit from other workers hav-
ing better skills. Even if my children would have great skills without 
early childhood education, their wages would still benefit from other 
people’s children having more skills. 
One reason for skill spillovers is that employers have to make 
decisions about technology use and job creation based on the overall 
supply of workers and skills, not on whether any given individual has 
skills. Even if I have great skills, if my coworkers have lousy skills, 
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Figure 6.1  Effects of a 1 Percent Increase in Metro Workers Who Are 
College Graduates on a Metro Area’s Average Wages 
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my employer is going to have more trouble introducing new tech-
nologies. This will harm the competitiveness of my employer, which 
will damage my wages. 
Even if all the workers at my firm have good skills, the firm will 
benefit if it can rely on quality products at good prices from local sup-
pliers. This depends upon these local suppliers having a ready supply 
of skilled workers. 
Finally, there are many industries that rely on obtaining ideas and 
workers from other firms in the same industry. This is part of the 
productivity advantage of local high-tech economies in Silicon Val-
ley. The productivity of a firm may depend on the skills of workers in 
other competing firms, which provide a source of ideas for my firm. 
The spillovers from competing firms and local suppliers have 
long been discussed in regional economics. They are called “agglom-
  
56 Bartik 
eration economies” and are characterized by productivity advantages 
from a cluster of an industry in a local economy. These agglomeration 
economies depend in part on worker skills. 
This book’s calculations in prior chapters of earnings gains for 
former child participants do not rely on spillover benefits.65 With 
spillover benefits, the aggregate economic gain from early childhood 
education might be at least double what was previously stated. 
How are these broad worker benefits realized? Employers will 
decide to expand, locate, or start up in a metro area because of the 
increased supply of workers with better skills. These employer deci-
sions lead to more jobs and better jobs, and this benefits all the area’s 
workers. 
Realizing such benefits at the local level requires that a signifi-
cant proportion of children remain in the same local economy in 
which they participated in early childhood education. The evidence 
indicates that this occurs. At least half of all Americans spend most 
of their career in the metropolitan area in which they spent their early 
childhood (Bartik 2011). Those who leave spread the productivity 
benefits of better skills to the broader state economy or to the national 
economy. Those who stay provide sizable spillover benefits for the 
local economy.66 
PEER EFFECTS IN EDUCATION 
These spillover wage effects provide a long-term argument for 
why I might want to pay higher taxes to help other people’s children. 
Are there short-term arguments? One short-term argument is peer 
effects in education. 
We know that there are peer effects in K–12 education. All chil-
dren in a classroom tend to learn more during a given year if the aver-
age skill level in the classroom at the year’s start is higher. 
The magnitude of these estimated peer effects is sizable, at least 
15 percent per school year (Hanushek et al. 2003; Hoxby 2000). If 
starting average achievement levels in a class are one grade level 
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higher, then students in that class would be expected to learn about 
0.15 grade levels more that year. 
Some research provides direct evidence that pre-K provides peer 
benefits in K–12. Neidell and Waldfogel (2010) estimate models of 
kindergarten achievement that control for the percentage of peers 
enrolled in pre-K. They find that for every additional child who was 
enrolled in pre-K, the overall increase in test scores in the kinder-
garten class is from 16 to 50 percent higher than would be predicted 
based on the individual effect on that child. 
If more children have higher skills, then teachers can spend more 
class time teaching to a higher standard. In addition, the teacher will 
need to spend less time bringing some individual children up to grade 
level. This frees up time for working individually with more stu-
dents to match their learning needs. Also, if children enter the class 
with better behavior, classroom disruptions will be fewer, which will 
increase learning for all students. 
Therefore, even if I already have the money to enroll my child 
in high-quality pre-K, or even if I think my child does not need high-
quality pre-K, I have an interest in paying higher taxes for pre-K for 
other people’s children, because it will enhance my child’s learning 
in K–12. 
SPILLOVERS FROM REDUCING CRIME 
In addition to spillovers on the legal labor market, early child-
hood education reduces crime. When we enhance an individual’s legal 
earnings prospects, we reduce the probability that that individual will 
become involved in criminal activity. Therefore, one other argument 
for why I should invest in other people’s children is that it reduces 
my own and my children’s probability of being a crime victim. This 
can be a powerful political argument. Furthermore, some evidence 
suggests that educational investments may be a more cost-effective 
way of fighting crime than longer prison sentences (Greenwood et 
al. 1998). 
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GOVERNMENT/TAXPAYER BENEFITS 
Another spillover benefit of early childhood education is fiscal 
benefits. By “fiscal benefits” we mean either greater tax revenues at 
unchanged tax rates or less need for government spending. Such fiscal 
benefits allow governments to help taxpayers, either by lowering tax 
rates without cutting services, or by improving services without tax 
rate increases. 
In the long run, the increased earnings due to early childhood 
education will be taxed by federal, state, and local governments. The 
increased earnings from early childhood education will also lower 
welfare usage, reducing the need for government spending. The drop 
in criminal activity will reduce prison costs and criminal justice sys-
tem spending. 
In the short run, early childhood education may reduce remedial 
education costs. Several studies suggest that early childhood educa-
tion reduces special education costs. Special education costs can be an 
extra $10,000 per year per child. Most studies suggest some reduction 
in special education costs from early childhood education, although 
the magnitude varies widely, from 23 to 86 percent.67 
Simulation studies conclude that in the long run, many early 
childhood education investments are self-financing. Estimates by 
Lynch (2007) suggest that after 43 years, high-quality universal pre-
K’s fiscal benefits will be about eight times program costs. Universal 
pre-K is estimated to break even from a combined federal and state 
government perspective after nine years, and for the average state 
after 23 years. 
Other simulation estimates are more conservative, but they agree 
that in the long run, fiscal benefits exceed direct budget costs. Dickens 
and Baschnagel (2008) conclude that a universal version of the Perry 
Preschool Program, a relatively expensive program, would break 
even in budget terms after 49 years. 
The problem is that policymakers must make decisions in the 
short run. And in the short run, early childhood education has fiscal 
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costs. The long-run fiscal benefits accrue to a variety of government 
revenue and spending accounts, many outside the education system. 
The fiscal benefits are removed both in time and governmental func-
tion from the immediate fiscal costs of pre-K for an education budget. 
PRE-K: THE NEXT GENERATION 
Early childhood education may have important spillover ben-
efits for the next generation. We know that parents’ income has large 
effects on their child’s future outcomes, especially for children in 
low-income families. Parent income in early childhood is particularly 
important. 
Duncan, Ziol-Guest, and Kalil (2010) find that added parental 
income makes a bigger difference for a child’s future adult earn-
ings for children from low-income families. Duncan, Morris, and 
Rodrigues (2011) find that antipoverty experiments that boost family 
income appear to boost a child’s academic performance. 
Of particular interest is the finding that a child’s future adult earn-
ings are more affected by the income of the child’s parents when the 
child is ages zero to five than by income in later childhood years. 
Once one controls for family income in early childhood, the family’s 
income when the child is ages 6 through 15 has little impact on the 
child’s future adult earnings. 
Children at ages five or less are particularly vulnerable to stresses. 
Poverty produces numerous stresses, such as a family being forced to 
move, or a parent losing a job. 
This raises the possibility that early childhood programs have 
next-generation benefits. If we invest now in early childhood educa-
tion, then that raises the earnings of former childhood participants 
as adults. When these former participants form their own families, 
their family’s income will be higher. This will lead to better childhood 
development in the next generation, and better adult outcomes for that 
generation. This virtuous cycle obviously can continue. 
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CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
There are very large economic spillovers from investing in high-
quality early childhood education programs. More speculative projec-
tions suggest that these economic spillovers extend into subsequent 
generations and make these programs self-financing in the long run. 
But perhaps of more immediate interest, there are huge skill spill-
overs on most workers’ wages from increasing overall skills. In a 
modern economy, workers are interdependent. We’re in this economy 
together. 
  
 
 
 
Chapter 7 
A Proposed Early Childhood 
Education Strategy
Based on research, what early childhood education strategy would 
provide the greatest economic benefits? This chapter proposes three 
programs, suggests methods for quality control, and considers possible 
roles of the federal government versus state and local governments. 
The proposed programs are 
1. Universal full-day pre-K available to all four-year-olds, with 
teachers paid public school wages and with relatively small 
class sizes of around 15 children for 2 teachers; 
2. Targeted full-time, full-year child care and pre-K available 
for all disadvantaged children from birth to age five, mod-
eled after the Abecedarian and Educare programs; 
3. Targeted parenting services for first-time disadvantaged 
mothers and their children from the prenatal period until age 
two, modeled after the Nurse Family Partnership. 
FULL-DAY UNIVERSAL PRE-K FOR FOUR-YEAR-OLDS 
Considering the pre-K proposal first, why this design? First, uni-
versal access, regardless of family income, would maximize aggregate 
economic impact. As discussed in Chapter 5, the available research 
evidence suggests that providing pre-K at age four to children from 
middle-class families has a high ratio of future earnings benefits to 
costs. If universal pre-K’s benefits in future earnings are similar in 
dollar terms for most of the income distribution, then the aggregate 
economic impact of pre-K increases roughly proportionately with the 
number of children enrolled, and is greatest with universal access. A
universal program would still be significantly redistributional, as the 
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future earnings benefits would be a much greater percentage boost for 
children from lower-income families. 
Furthermore, the broader the pre-K access, the greater the spill-
over benefits in increasing the economy’s productivity and most 
workers’ wages (see Chapter 6). Higher skills for children from both 
lower-income and middle-income backgrounds would spill over to 
benefit the other group. 
Universal access to pre-K might also provide positive peer effects 
in pre-K classrooms, increasing pre-K’s effectiveness for lower-
income children. Research suggests pre-K children benefit from hav-
ing peers with higher skills. The spillover is 20 percent: Including 
more kids with higher test scores increases the class test scores by 
20 percent more than predicted based on the direct effect (Henry 
and Rickman 2007).68 No one thinks that the ideal pre-K design is 
income-segregated “separate but equal” programs. Yet this is what we 
do when we have Head Start limited to poor children, state programs 
targeting the near-poor, and private pre-K programs serving the upper 
class. 
Universal access pre-K is likely to have broader political popu-
larity. However, the primary rationale for universal access is not polit-
ical expediency, but larger economic benefits. 
A full-day pre-K program is likely more attractive to many fami-
lies, because it minimizes child care costs and hassles of arranging 
wraparound child care. This easier access will increase program take-
up rates and thereby aggregate economic impact. A full-day program 
does have somewhat lower bang for the buck than a half-day pro-
gram. But the incremental benefits of full-day programs over half-
day programs exceed costs even if take-up rates do not increase. The 
higher take-up rate adds additional economic benefits. 
The universal program would be restricted to age four because 
there is no research on the benefits of age three pre-K for middle-
class children. As discussed below, age three pre-K for disadvantaged 
children would be provided by a targeted program. 
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The pre-K program would lean toward being overfunded for high 
quality, by paying public school wages and having low class sizes. As 
discussed in Chapter 5, the research on these “structural” quality fea-
tures is inconclusive. But it is prudent to imitate the pre-K programs 
with the greatest success, such as Perry, Chicago CPC, Tulsa, and 
Boston, which pay high salaries and have modest class sizes. 
TARGETED EDUCARE/ABECEDARIAN FOR ALL
DISADVANTAGED CHILDREN 
In addition to universal pre-K, the proposal includes an Educare/ 
Abecedarian program offering free education-oriented child care and 
pre-K full-time from six weeks of age up to age five to the needi-
est children. The income targeting of this program is justified by 
the research that suggests that such comprehensive child care pro-
vides significant benefits only for children from lower-income back-
grounds. The Educare/Abecedarian model would be used because it 
has the most extensive research evidence. 
The 26 percent adult earnings boost from Educare/Abecedarian 
is over two-and-a-half times the 10 percent earnings boost that dis-
advantaged children might get from full-day pre-K. Table 7.1 shows 
that adding on Educare to full-day pre-K for disadvantaged children 
has added earnings benefits that exceed the added costs. The benefit-
cost ratio for this addition is only slightly above one, but the dollar 
Table 7.1  Benefits versus Costs per Child of Adding Educare to Pre-K 
Full-day pre-K Educare birth 
at age 4 to age 5 Difference 
Earnings benefits $53,000 $134,000 $81,000 
Program costs $10,000 $87,000 $77,000 
Ratio of benefits to costs 5.3 1.5 1.1 
NOTE: Benefits and costs are rounded to the nearest thousand, in present-value 2012 
dollars. The first two columns of numbers come from Table 3.1. The third column 
subtracts age four pre-K benefits and costs from Educare benefits and costs. 
SOURCE: Author’s calculations, as explained in text and endnotes. 
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net benefit per child is sizable. These dollar benefits are targeted at a 
needy group, while the taxes would be raised from wealthier groups. 
In addition to these direct earnings benefits for former child par-
ticipants, the extra skills from Educare will add to spillover benefits. 
Also, five years of full-day child care will have much higher benefits 
for parental earnings. 
NURSE FAMILY PARTNERSHIP FOR ALL
DISADVANTAGED FIRST-TIME MOTHERS 
The proposal includes full funding for Nurse Family Partnership 
services for everyone in the program’s target group, which is disad-
vantaged first-time mothers. The services would be income-targeted 
because of the research evidence that the NFP is most effective for 
this group. 
The NFP is included because it has the most extensive research 
evidence for long-term benefits among parenting programs. However, 
local areas would be given options for experimenting with alternative 
parenting programs that show some evidence of success. 
COSTS 
This proposal’s costs are presented in Table 7.2.69 Universal 
pre-K is assumed to enroll 74 percent of all four-year-olds, similar to 
Oklahoma’s program. Educare is assumed to be funded sufficiently 
to be open to all children under five from families below the poverty 
line, which is 25 percent of all children. Three-quarters of all such 
families are assumed to take up this offer. The NFP is assumed to be 
funded sufficiently to provide assistance from the prenatal period to 
age two for all first-time mothers whose family income is below 185 
percent of the poverty line (the cutoff used in the federal school lunch 
program); about 44 percent of all children are below this income line, 
and about 30 percent of these low-income children are first-born chil-
dren. Three-quarters of these first-time mothers are assumed to par-
ticipate in the program. 
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Table 7.2  Annual National Costs of Large-Scale Early Childhood Education Proposal 
Number of children Annual gross costs Net costs 
Universal pre-K for 4-year-olds 3.0 million $31 billion $25 billion 
Educare, birth to 5, for poor children 3.7 million $68 billion $58 billion 
NFP for disadvantaged first-time moms 0.9 million $4 billion $4 billion 
Adjusted for pre-K overlap (0.8 million) ($8 billion) 
Total 6.3 million $79 billion 
NOTE: Annual costs per child are $10,050 for universal pre-K, $18,381 for full-time child-care pre-K, $4,500 for home-visiting/parenting. Net 
costs are lower than gross costs because of cost savings on existing early childhood programs. Cost savings for universal pre-K are $6 billion 
for state pre-K. Cost savings for Educare are $8 billion for Head Start and $2 billion for child care subsidies. Cost savings for the NFP are $0.4 
billion in Affordable Care Act funding for home-visiting. Total costs are adjusted for overlap between pre-K services under universal pre-K 
versus Educare for four-year-olds below the poverty line. Number of participants is adjusted for this overlap, and for children in both home-
visiting and full-time child care programs. 
SOURCE: Author’s calculations, as explained in text and endnotes. 
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Some cost offsets for these programs occur because of savings on 
funds currently spent on state pre-K programs, Head Start, and fed-
eral child care subsidies. In addition, there is some overlap between 
the programs, which would save on costs if all three programs were 
implemented, specifically in pre-K services for four-year-olds below 
the poverty line. 
All three programs would cost just under $80 billion annually. 
Over six million children would receive services. Most costs would 
be for Educare, followed by universal pre-K. 
How large are these costs? These costs are 2.0 percent of total 
combined federal, state, and local taxes; 3.1 percent of total federal 
taxes; and 5.6 percent of total state and local taxes.70 This would rep-
resent a significant but feasible increase in state and local tax efforts, 
but it would be less of a stretch if participated in by all levels of gov-
ernment. The $79 billion total cost is 13 percent of what is currently 
spent on public K–12 education (National Center for Education Sta-
tistics 2013). Therefore, such an expenditure would represent a con-
siderable increase, but not an outlandish increase, in what is spent on 
public education. 
AGGREGATE BENEFITS 
As suggested by previous chapters, this total expenditure of $79 
billion annually would increase the present value of future earnings 
of former child participants by a multiple of between two and three 
times these program costs.71 Spillover benefits due to peer effects and 
agglomeration effects might be more than double the direct effects 
on former child participants. Anticrime benefits might be at least as 
valuable as the earnings benefits. Dynamic effects of expanded early 
childhood education on U.S. growth rates, as well as second genera-
tion effects, would further increase these economic benefits. In the 
long run, this proposal is likely to be self-financing, certainly after 50 
years or so. But the problem is how to finance, set up, and manage 
these investments in the short run and the medium run, over the next 
50 years. 
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This proposal would also make a considerable dent in U.S. 
income inequality. From 1979 to 2007, the real income growth of the 
lowest-income quintile and the real income growth of the middle-
income quintile both lagged behind the average per-household income 
growth.72 Growth in average income per household is higher because 
it includes the extra real income growth of the highest-income quin-
tile (including the highest 1 percent of earners), which has captured 
much of the long-term growth in the United States. 
The income growth trends imply that for the lowest-income quin-
tile from 1979 to 2007 to have matched the growth of average house-
hold income, its 2007 income would have to be boosted by 19 percent. 
For the middle-income quintile from 1979 to 2007 to have matched 
the growth of average household income, its income would have to 
be boosted by 24 percent.73 To eliminate these gaps through increased 
earnings requires higher-percentage increases in earnings, as earnings 
are only a portion of household income. The required earnings boosts 
for the lowest-income quintile and the middle-income quintile both 
turn out, by coincidence, to equal a 31 percent boost in real earnings.74 
What could this proposal do to counter these adverse trends in 
U.S. income inequality? As outlined in previous chapters, full-day 
pre-K might raise average earnings for the middle class by 5 percent. 
Therefore, by itself, universal pre-K would offset one-sixth (5 percent 
divided by 31 percent) of the lagging income growth of the middle 
class over the last 30 years. Educare from birth to age five might boost 
average earnings of children from low-income families by 26 percent. 
This would offset five-sixths (26 percent divided by 31 percent) of the 
lagging income growth of the lowest-income quintile over the past 
30 years. To this would be added a 3 percent earnings boost from the 
NFP for the 30 percent of low-income children who are first-born 
children. Early childhood education cannot by itself permanently 
solve the income inequality problem, but it does make a considerable 
dent in offsetting recent inequality trends. 
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ACCOUNTABILITY AND QUALITY IMPROVEMENT 
Large benefits of early childhood education depend upon high 
quality. The funding levels per child outlined above are sufficient for 
high quality, but they provide no guarantee. 
To check on program quality, outcomes for program participants 
should regularly be measured relative to a comparison group that is 
similar in observed and unobserved preexisting characteristics. For 
universal pre-K, this comparison can be done using the “regression 
discontinuity” methodology, as discussed in Chapter 2. Universal 
pre-K participants would be tested both at pre-K entrance and at kin-
dergarten entrance. If pre-K has an impact, this should be apparent in 
a “jump”—a discontinuity—in test scores at the age cutoff for kinder-
garten entrance. 
For Educare and the NFP, outcomes for program participants 
should be measured by comparing the targeted low-income group 
with similar children whose family income is slightly above the cut-
off for the program. If these programs have an impact, the outcomes 
for children just below the income cutoff should be elevated relative 
to outcomes for children just above the income cutoff. 
While cognitive test scores are useful for monitoring overall pro-
gram quality, heavy reliance on cognitive test scores may be problem-
atic as a tool for accountability for individual classrooms or teach-
ers. As discussed in previous chapters, much of the impact of early 
childhood education comes from the program’s long-run effects on 
social skills and character skills. The initial boost to cognitive skills 
is important in helping lead to these long-run effects. But the initial 
boost to social and character skills is also important. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, the initial boost to cognitive test scores tends to under-
predict long-run earnings effects, which suggests that something else 
is going on. An accountability system for individual early-childhood 
teachers that relies too much on cognitive test-score gains may lead 
teachers to underemphasize social and character skills. 
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A promising alternative accountability system for individual 
classrooms and teachers would rely on outside observers, who would 
provide an objective assessment of the quality of teacher-student 
interactions in the early childhood classroom. Such observer ratings 
are predictive of test score gains. Yet most observer ratings focus not 
just on cognitive skills, but also on whether the classroom climate 
develops social and character skills. In addition, an observer rating 
system, compared to an accountability system based solely on cogni-
tive test scores, provides more useful immediate feedback to teachers. 
Such observer rating systems might usefully be supplemented by 
teacher mentors who work with classroom teachers. After an observer 
rating, mentors can provide teachers with advice and training on how 
to improve.75 
Such observer rating systems and teacher mentoring offer prom-
ise for improving the quality of pre-K and child care programs. 
Observer audits and mentoring might also be used to improve the 
quality of home-visiting/parenting programs. 
WHAT LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE 
RESPONSIBLE FOR EARLY CHILDHOOD EDUCATION? 
An important issue is how responsibility for early childhood edu-
cation should be divided among federal, state, and local governments. 
Where possible, we should explore whether responsibility can feasi-
bly be assigned to state and local governments, for several reasons. 
First, the federal government has a lot on its plate. Health care and an 
aging population will absorb a great deal of federal money and atten-
tion. Federal resources are limited and should be focused on program 
elements for which the federal government has special comparative 
advantages over state and local governments. 
Second, the federal government can sometimes be more bureau-
cratic than state and local governments. Over-rigidity in government 
is a particular problem for early childhood education, which needs 
experimentation with new program designs. 
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For universal pre-K, state and local government responsibility for 
the financing of basic operations seems feasible because the benefits 
of universal pre-K are mostly local. Over 60 percent of all Americans 
spend the bulk of their working careers in the state in which they 
spent their early childhoods (Bartik 2011). If a state invests in uni-
versal pre-K, about three-quarters of the increased earnings from this 
investment will accrue to workers who stay in the state.76 
State and local areas that outcompete other areas in offering uni-
versal pre-K may obtain some extra benefits in higher property val-
ues. Even if people do not fully understand the value of universal pre-
K, we know that people value higher elementary-school test scores in 
the housing market, because research studies have consistently found 
that a similar house will sell for more if it is assigned to a school with 
higher test scores. From the estimated effects of higher test scores on 
higher property values, and the estimated effects of pre-K on higher 
test scores, we can estimate that universal pre-K would be expected 
to increase property values by at least six times the annual program 
costs (Bartik 2011, Table 7.3). This benefits all local property owners, 
not just parents, which helps broaden local support. The increased 
local property-tax revenues might also increase the incentive for local 
governments to invest in pre-K.77 
State and local responsibility for universal pre-K also seems fea-
sible because the cost is modest compared to current state responsi-
bilities. The $25 billion cost of universal pre-K would add only 1.75 
percent to overall state and local taxes. This cost is also only 4 percent 
of what is currently spent on K–12 education.78 
The federal government may have a comparative advantage in 
supporting some universal pre-K components, such as the evaluation 
and training components described previously. What is learned from 
evaluating a particular program benefits the entire nation, not one 
state or local area. Furthermore, self-evaluation by a state of its own 
programs is politically challenging. Federal standards and financing 
for evaluation can help encourage evaluations to have greater quality 
and objectivity. Finally, because quality is hard to measure, there may 
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be some political temptation for state and local governments to over-
state program quality and under-invest in quality improvement. Fed-
eral financial support and standards for quality improvement can help 
offset this temptation. For all of these reasons, the quality of universal 
pre-K is likely to be improved if there is generous federal financial 
support for a testing-and-outside-observer evaluation system, and for 
teacher mentors. 
For early childhood education programs that are targeted at the 
poor, such as Educare and the NFP, greater federal responsibility may 
be necessary. The interests of the poor often have limited political 
clout in state and local policy. Whether justified or not, state and local 
policymakers often fear that income redistribution may repel middle-
class and upper-class state residents, while attracting lower-class resi-
dents. Educare plus the NFP would cost $62 billion annually, which is 
4.4 percent of overall state and local taxes. Although this is a modest 
tax increase, it is a hard sell for a proposal whose direct benefits are 
limited to low-income families. If high-quality child care for the poor 
is ever to become a reality in the United States, the federal govern-
ment will probably have to play a major role in providing the needed 
funds. 
CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
Research evidence supports a proposal that would provide some 
direct benefits from universal pre-K for all families, while providing 
extra services at earlier ages for low-income families. Involvement 
by all levels of government in financing the system can be justified. 
Higher quality for these programs should be promoted by adequate 
financial support, program monitoring, and training. 

 
 
 
 
Chapter 8 
Why Early Childhood 
Education Makes Sense Now
ECE’s Place in the Ongoing Struggle for
Broader Economic Opportunities 
As this book has argued, high-quality early childhood education 
can increase U.S. economic growth and broaden opportunities. In this 
chapter, early childhood education is put in a larger context. Early 
childhood education is part of a strategy to increase the quality of 
the U.S. labor supply, which along with labor demand policies can 
increase job quality. Early childhood education builds on a history in 
this country of education reforms. Today’s economy requires more 
skills, while research shows that interventions pay off at earlier ages 
than was once supposed. 
LABOR SUPPLY AND LABOR DEMAND 
To broadly increase earnings, the American economy needs to 
expand both the labor supply of skills and the demand for skills. 
Higher employment and wages require more skilled workers as well 
as sufficient labor demand to employ these workers at high wages. 
Private market forces lead to some expansion of skills supply and 
demand. However, throughout American history, expansion of skills 
supply and demand has also been pursued by government. 
HISTORY MATTERS 
Historically in the United States, skills supply and demand have 
been affected by many policies. On the labor demand side, these have 
included the banking system; the legal framework for limited-liability 
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corporations; infrastructure investments in canals, railroads, high-
ways, and airports; antitrust regulations; and regulations of wages and 
working conditions. 
The United States has also reformed education to enhance quality 
and broaden benefits to more Americans. Our education system was 
not set in stone by the Founding Fathers: At the time of the American 
Revolution and for some years thereafter, public education was lim-
ited in scope and access. Public schools charged fees to most students, 
although these fees might be waived for “paupers.” Public education 
did not extend all the way to high school, let alone college. 
American education changed with the “common school move-
ment” of the nineteenth century and the “high school movement” of 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The common school 
movement, a grassroots effort that spread from state to state, advo-
cated universal, free public education in graded schools up through 
eighth grade. The high school movement advocated universal, free 
high school education. The United States was the world leader in pur-
suing education for all to such an advanced level. 
THE CONTINUING ARGUMENT OVER EXPANDING 
EDUCATIONAL ACCESS 
These education reforms were contested. Past arguments made 
for the common school and for high school for all can be used, with 
slight modifications, to argue for early childhood education today. 
Horace Mann, a prominent figure in the common school move-
ment whose changes in Massachusetts spread nationwide, made 
explicit that this reform was aimed at broadening economic opportu-
nity. According to Mann, writing in 1848, 
Nothing but universal education can counterwork [the] ten-
dency to the domination of capital and the servility of labor. . . . 
If education be equally diffused, it will draw property after it by 
the strongest of all attractions, for such a thing never did hap-
pen, and never can happen, as that an intelligent and practical 
body of men should be permanently poor. 
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For this reason, our economic theories must include education: 
That political economy, therefore, which busies itself about 
capital and labor, supply and demand, interests and rents, 
favorable and unfavorable balances of trade, but leaves out of 
account the elements of a wide-spread mental development, is 
naught but stupendous folly. (Mann 1848) 
Thaddeus Stevens, later an abolitionist leader in the U.S. Con-
gress, made his reputation in the Pennsylvania state legislature by 
arguing that public education should be free for all, not just for “pau-
pers.” In 1835, Stevens argued that universal free access would avoid 
stigmatizing the poor: 
The amendment which is now proposed . . . is, in my opinion, of 
a most hateful and degrading character. . . . It proposes that . . .
the names of those who have the misfortune to be poor men’s 
children shall be forever preserved, as a distinct class, in the 
archives of the county. The teacher, too, is to keep in his school 
a pauper book, and register the names and attendance of poor 
scholars; thus pointing out and recording their poverty in the 
midst of their companions. Sir, hereditary distinctions of rank 
are sufficiently odious, but that which is founded on poverty is 
infinitely more so. Such a law should be entitled, “An act for 
branding and marking the poor, so that they may be known from 
the rich and proud.” (Stevens 1835, reprinted in 1904) 
Education reformers held that broader educational access was in 
the enlightened self-interest of most Americans. The state education 
department in Iowa, in 1914, argued the following: 
The landlord who lives in town . . . may well be reminded that 
when he offers his farm for sale it will be to his advantage to 
advertise, ‘free transportation to a good graded school.’ Those 
who have no children to attend school . . . should be interested 
in securing to the children of the whole community the best edu-
cational advantages possible. . . . If they live out their years 
with no children to depend upon in old age, they must of neces-
sity rely upon someone, they know not whom, who is today in 
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the public schools. Their only safeguard lies in giving the best 
advantages possible to all. (Goldin and Katz 2008, p. 193). 
Expanded education was contested. In 1874, in the “Kalamazoo 
School Case,” local property owners argued that they shouldn’t have 
to pay taxes for a free public high school because it was unnecessary 
for most Americans to go to high school. But the Michigan Supreme 
Court, in a ruling that influenced courts throughout the United States, 
held that more education was of broad public benefit: 
We must confess to no little surprise that the legislation and 
policy of our state were appealed to against the right of the state 
to furnish a liberal education to the youth of the state in schools 
brought within the reach of all classes. We supposed it had 
always been understood in this state that education, not merely 
in the rudiments, but in an enlarged sense, was regarded as an 
important practical advantage to be supplied at their option to 
rich and poor alike, and not as something pertaining merely to 
culture and accomplishment to be brought as such within the 
reach of those whose accumulated wealth enabled them to pay 
for it. (Stuart v. Kalamazoo School Dist. 1874) 
BUT WHY EARLY CHILDHOOD EDUCATION? 
AND WHY NOW? 
But even if education in general is good, why expand early child-
hood education? What has changed that might justify this departure 
from longstanding tradition? 
First, globalization and technological change mean that both indi-
vidual prosperity, and the collective prosperity of a nation, state, or 
city, depend more and more upon better skills for all. Skills devel-
opment must be a higher public priority, by any means that work. 
Among alternative means for developing skills, research support is 
especially strong for early childhood education. 
Second, our research on child development has advanced. Earlier-
age educational interventions provide more child development ben-
efits than was once supposed. 
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Third, many families are under increased stress. If more fami-
lies need to rely on outside child care, efforts should be increased to 
ensure that this care enhances educational development. 
DOING THE GOOD WE KNOW HOW TO DO 
Expanded early childhood education is not the only policy that 
could expand economic opportunities for most Americans. K–16 
reforms could help, by increasing teacher quality, adding additional 
learning time, or making postsecondary options more affordable. 
Labor demand policies could help, by investing in infrastructure, 
providing manufacturing extension services, increasing minimum 
wages, and enacting lower marginal tax rates on job creation. 
But early childhood education is a policy that we know can work, 
and that we know how to do. As outlined in this book, there is rig-
orous research evidence that high-quality early childhood education 
works in building skills and earnings. We also have ways of monitor-
ing and improving program quality, through a combination of testing, 
classroom observations, and teacher mentors. 
The argument can be raised that our knowledge is imperfect. 
More good research is needed, but skepticism can go too far. No 
social reform will ever have perfect evidence. Early childhood edu-
cation has more evidence of short-term and long-term effectiveness 
than almost any other proposed intervention to broaden opportunities. 
Early childhood education can make a difference, even if we do 
nothing else about labor supply or demand. Pre-K programs can boost 
children’s opportunities, even if we do not solve all the problems of the 
K–16 system. For example, the Chicago Child-Parent Centers helped 
child participants to increase their adult earnings, even though the 
Chicago Public Schools system continues to face many challenges. 
Furthermore, skills development from early childhood education 
will create good jobs, even without policies that directly target job 
creation. A metropolitan area that uses early childhood education to 
boost its residents’ skills will attract and grow high-quality jobs. 
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Broadening economic opportunities for most Americans is chal-
lenging. To make progress, we need feasible policies that can make 
a big difference. Throughout their nation’s history, Americans have 
sought to expand educational opportunities. A logical next step, backed 
by research, is expanding high-quality early childhood education. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes 
1. State pre-K data here and following from Barnett et al. (2013). Dollar 
figures are in 2012–2013 dollars. 
2. This book ignores recent federal proposals by President Obama and oth-
ers, both because their passage is unlikely and because such discussion 
instantly becomes dated. 
3. Unless otherwise stated, all dollar figures in this book are stated in 2012 
dollars. 
4. In 2012, total federal, state, and local government tax receipts plus social 
insurance contributions were $3,997 billion (BEA 2012). 
5. The education effects are calculated based on the age 30 analysis of the 
Abecedarian program (Campbell et al. 2012). The earnings effects of 
educational improvements are calculated using data from the Current 
Population Survey’s Outgoing Rotation Group on African American 
wages, employment rates, and weekly work hours for different educa-
tion groups (Bartik 2011, Technical Appendix 4B). The extra employ-
ment effects are calculated by adding on 12 percent to the treatment 
group employment rate at age 21, and by moderating this difference to 
be 6 percent at ages 27 and above. Campbell et al. (2002) find employ-
ment rate effects at age 21 that are 12 percent above the predicted effect 
of increased education. 
6. Bartik 2011, Technical Appendix 4B. The anticrime effects depend on 
how imprisonment and a prison record affect earnings. Test-score effects 
are based on correlations between test scores and adult earnings. 
7. Realizing the power of random assignment requires that there be only 
modest problems stemming from imperfect adherence to random assign-
ment or sample attrition. These conditions have been met for early child-
hood programs. For example, the benefits of Perry Preschool have sur-
vived a reexamination of the program by Heckman et al. (2010). 
8. Although random assignment experiments are the “gold standard,” they 
are difficult to do, expensive, and rare. Studies with good comparison 
groups due to “natural experiments” should be viewed as “silver stan-
dard” evidence, as the treatment and comparison groups are likely sim-
ilar in unobserved characteristics. Studies that only have controls for 
observable characteristics provide “bronze standard” evidence: sugges-
tive but possibly biased. 
9. CPC’s evidence is less rigorous than other natural experiments because 
CPC is comparing voluntary participants in CPC in treatment-group 
neighborhoods with a sample of all children in comparison neighbor-
hoods, which includes both families who would have participated in 
CPC and others. However, this comparison is better than comparing vol-
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unteers with non-volunteers, as is done in many education studies. The 
CPC evidence suggests that the treatment and the comparison groups 
are similar in observed characteristics. The CPC study is somewhere 
between a “silver standard” natural experiment and a “bronze standard” 
study that controls only for observable characteristics. However, the 
CPC is of great value because it is one of the few large-scale studies of 
pre-K with long-term evidence on adult outcomes. 
10. The 8 percent estimate comes from using educational attainment to pre-
dict lifetime earnings effects (Reynolds, Temple, White, et al. 2011). 
Direct estimates at age 28 estimate an effect at that age of 7 percent 
(Reynolds, Temple, Ou, et al. 2011). 
11. These studies control for observed individual characteristics in esti-
mating how test scores predict adult earnings. Chetty et al.’s (2011) 
results rely on random assignment to classes with different average test-
score effects for classmates, which controls for unobserved preexisting 
characteristics. 
12. All test score predictions of adult earnings effects in this book are based 
on Chetty et al. (2011). A study’s test score effects are first translated 
into change in percentiles in the overall test score distribution. Where 
possible, this is done using the study’s information. Other times, the 
study only provides effect size estimates for test scores using the stan-
dard deviation in some disadvantaged group. If the study does so, this 
book assumes, based on Bartik, Gormley, and Adelstein (2012), that the 
standard deviation of test scores for the disadvantaged group is 76.5 
percent of the standard deviation for all children. If no information is 
provided in the study on the starting test score percentile, this book 
assumes, based on Weiland and Yoshikawa (2013), that disadvantaged 
students start 0.71 standard deviations below the overall sample mean. 
For determining percentage earnings effects at the overall population 
mean, the book uses the estimated dollar and percentage effects implied 
by Chetty et al.’s Appendix Table V, column 1, except that these esti-
mates are adjusted downward by the ratio of the “leave-out mean”
estimates for kindergarten entrants to the ordinary least squares (OLS) 
estimates in Chetty et al.’s Appendix Table XIII. If the study’s target 
group is disadvantaged children, effects are translated into percentage 
effects on their earnings by using updated data to do adjustments, as in 
Bartik, Gormley, and Adelstein (2012), for how these children’s future 
earnings are likely to compare to average income, given their parents’
income relative to average income. These updated data, based on earn-
ings data in the American Community Survey for parents of public 
school first-graders, predict that children eligible for a free or reduced-
price lunch will have expected adult earnings equal to 71 percent of 
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average earnings. Subsequent endnotes will describe this procedure as 
this book’s standard test score prediction of earnings procedure. 
13. These test score predictions differ from Bartik, Gormley, and Adelstein 
(2012). Their estimates assumed that the standard deviation in the disad-
vantaged group was equal to the standard deviation in the overall popu-
lation and that the testing end score was at the median, and also pre-
dicted percentage effects at population mean earnings. This book makes 
more accurate assumptions. 
14. This is based on Leak et al.’s (2010) end-of-treatment mean effect size 
of 0.28, which is assumed to be for disadvantaged groups. The earnings 
prediction is based on this book’s standard procedure. 
15. Based on Camilli et al.’s (2010) mean short-term effect size of 0.48, 
which is assumed to be for disadvantaged groups. The earnings predic-
tion is based on this book’s standard procedure. 
16. The IHDP was targeted at low-birth-weight babies. The IHDP estimates 
used in this book are from Duncan and Sojourner’s (2013) analysis for 
heavier or “high” low-birth-weight babies. They argue that these results 
can generate good predictions for the general U.S. population. 
17. Low income is defined as less than 180 percent of the poverty line. The 
results for low-income children show strongly significant effects for IQ 
at ages two, three, five, and eight. The reading results at age eight only 
have a p-value of 0.216, and the math results at age eight have a p-value 
of 0.099. However, the reading and math test score effects are consistent 
in magnitude with the IQ effects at ages five and eight. Therefore, on the 
whole the results suggest that reading and math achievement are boosted 
at age eight. 
18. These earnings predictions use this book’s standard procedure and are 
based on Duncan and Sojourner’s (2013) reading and math test score 
effects. 
19. This is based on test score effects in Ladd, Muschkin, and Dodge’s 
(2014) preferred model, column 2 of Table 4. Estimates for both read-
ing and math are multiplied by 11 to reflect average 2009 funding. This 
standard deviation effect is then averaged across reading and math tests. 
The starting point is assumed to be the median, given that these are all-
student averages. The implied percentile effect is then combined with 
Chetty et al. (2011) to get percentage earnings effects. 
20. As discussed in Bartik, Gormley, and Adelstein (2012), each point in 
Figure 2.1 shows the average test score of a group of students, where 
students are sorted by age. This is done to make the pattern of how test 
scores vary with age easier to see. 
21. Regression discontinuity (RD) studies of pre-K have been criticized, 
but these criticisms are not convincing. Whitehurst (2013b) argues that 
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RD estimates also reflect different parent behavior in the pre-K year. 
This is true, but the main difference is that parents enroll their kid in
pre-K. The comparison group in RD studies is less likely to participate 
in pre-K than a randomly assigned control group that enters kindergar-
ten next year. This affects the interpretation of the RD estimates: These 
estimates reflect effects of pre-K versus no pre-K to a greater extent 
than do random assignment estimates, which reflect this pre-K program 
versus other pre-K. But this is more of a feature than a bug if the pre-K 
estimates are being compared with the program’s costs. 
RD pre-K studies have been criticized because some children who 
enter pre-K will not enter kindergarten in the same school district, and 
therefore will be excluded from the treatment group (Armor and Sousa 
2014). But this attrition could bias estimates in either direction. In addi-
tion, Bartik (2013) finds that RD estimates of pre-K’s effects do not 
much change when we restrict estimates to the same children tested at 
both pre-K entrance and kindergarten entrance. Furthermore, if RD stud-
ies of pre-K are biased by attrition, this should result in a jump in other 
observables at the age cutoff, which is not seen in most studies. Bartik, 
Gormley, and Adelstein (2012) and Weiland and Yoshikawa (2013) do 
sensitivity tests and do not find evidence to suggest significant bias. 
Weiland and Yoshikawa reweight the data to correct for attrition, which 
makes little difference. 
22. This is based on effect sizes of 0.4 to 0.6 in regression discontinuity 
studies (Bartik 2013, Table 1). 
23. The 6-to-15-percent range is derived from the Bartik, Gormley, and 
Adelstein (2012) result that Tulsa’s half-day program increases adult 
earnings of low-income children by 6 percent, and the Weiland and 
Yoshikawa (2013) result that earnings of low-income children will be 
boosted by Boston’s full-day program by 15 percent. But this is consis-
tent with other research. The average regression discontinuity effect size 
estimated in Wong et al. (2008), Hustedt, Barnett, and Jung (2008), and 
Hustedt et al. (2010) is an effect size of 0.407. Using this book’s stan-
dard prediction procedure, the percentage gain in adult earnings implied 
by this 0.407 effect size is 7.4 percent. 
24. Based on data graciously provided by Christina Weiland, the average 
percentile gain in test scores for free and reduced-price lunch children is 
21 percentiles. This is used to predict earnings effects using this book’s 
standard procedure. 
25. Based on Tulsa (Bartik, Gormley, and Adelstein 2012). Boston estimates 
suggest a 15 percent earnings effect (Weiland and Yoshikawa 2013). 
26. Chapter 2 and its notes explain how these estimates are based on Abece-
darian and NFP estimates. 
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27. The $18,381 cost per year of Abecedarian/Educare is from Ludwig and 
Sawhill (2007), updated to 2012 prices. 
28. The $10,050 figure is from Gault et al. (2008), updated to 2012 prices. A
pre-K program is assumed to be six hours per day, class size of 15 chil-
dren with 2 teachers, and lead teacher paid public school wages. 
29. Costs from the NFP: http://www.nursefamilypartnership.org/assets/PDF/
Fact-sheets/NFP_Snapshot. 
30. Future adult earnings for disadvantaged children are calculated the same 
as in the test score projections of earnings. The method is an updated 
national version of Bartik, Gormley, and Adelstein (2012). The 2012 
American Community Survey is used to calculate average earnings by 
gender and year for all adults, and for three other groups: parents of first-
graders whose family income makes them eligible for 1) a free lunch, 
2) a reduced-price lunch, or 3) no lunch subsidy. As in Bartik, Gormley, 
and Adelstein, the average ratios of gender and age cells for these groups 
are projected into the future by assuming an intergenerational correla-
tion of earnings of 0.4 (Chadwick and Solon 2002; Solon 2002). The 
relative weights for free-lunch versus reduced-price-lunch students are 
based on Tulsa pre-K enrollment. To calculate future earnings for dis-
advantaged children (e.g., eligible for a free or reduced-price lunch), 
average future earnings are multiplied by the ratio of disadvantaged 
children’s future earnings to overall average adult earnings, which is 
projected to be 71.4 percent. For children from families ineligible for a 
free or reduced-price lunch, the projected ratio of future earnings to the 
overall average is estimated to be 130.1 percent. Future real earnings 
are assumed to increase by 1.2 percent per year, as in Bartik (2011), 
based on Social Security Administration projections. Future earnings 
and costs are discounted to age four for pre-K, age zero for Educare and 
the NFP. The social discount rate is the commonly used rate of 3 percent, 
as explained in Bartik (2011). 
In subsequent endnotes, this procedure is referred to as this book’s 
standard baseline earnings prediction procedure. For reference, the 
sum of career earnings in the ACS without any assumed real earnings 
increase or discounting is $1,556,000. With a 1.2 percent projected 
increase from age four, average future earnings without discounting 
sum to $2,584,000. With the 1.2 percent projected increase plus a 3 per-
cent discount back to age four, discounted average future earnings are 
$766,000. If instead we project a 1.2 percent annual real increase from 
birth, average future earnings without discounting sum to $2,710,000. 
With a 1.2 percent annual real increase plus a 3 percent discount rate 
back to birth, discounted average future earnings are $714,000. For 
disadvantaged children these figures are multiplied by 71.4 percent. 
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For non-disadvantaged children, these figures are multiplied by 130.1 
percent. 
For the benefit calculations in Table 3.1, the percentage earnings 
gains of 9.7 percent for full-day pre-K, 26.4 percent for Educare, and 
3.2 percent for the NFP are applied to the present value of future adult 
earnings for disadvantaged children as of age four for pre-K, and at birth 
for Educare and the NFP. Cost figures are also discounted to the appro-
priate age for each program. 
31. A half-day school-year pre-K program at age four has parental earn-
ings benefits, in present-value terms, of 2 percent of the child’s earnings 
benefits (Bartik 2011, p. 81). An eight-hour-per-day pre-K program for 
45 weeks at age four has parental earnings benefits of 4 percent of the 
child’s benefits (Bartik 2011, endnote 38, p. 156). 
32. Murray (2013) makes two other criticisms. “The main problem is the 
small size of the samples [for these two programs]. . . . Another problem 
is that the evaluations of both Perry Preschool and Abecedarian were 
overseen by the same committed, well-intentioned people who con-
ducted the demonstration projects.” On the first criticism, small sample 
size is accounted for when standard errors are calculated. As Heckman 
has argued, “a small sample would actually work toward not finding 
anything. . . . There are methods that account for the small sample size. 
Size doesn’t matter. It holds up” (Matthews 2013). On the second criti-
cism, Perry and Abecedarian have been analyzed by outside research-
ers—Perry by Heckman et al. (2010) and Abecedarian by Barnett and 
Masse (2007) and Temple and Reynolds (2007). 
33. Similar criticisms are made by Murray (2013), the Wall Street Journal
(2013), Dalmia and Snell (2013), Wertheimer and Vedantam (2013), and 
FactCheck.org (2013). 
34. Similar criticisms are made by Whitehurst (2013b) and the Wall Street 
Journal (2013). 
35. Similar criticisms are made by the Wall Street Journal (2013). 
36. Similar criticisms are made by Wertheimer and Vedantam (2013),
FactCheck.org (2013), and Murray (2013). 
37. The test score effects in the text are for the Peabody Picture Vocabulary 
test, the Woodcock Johnson III Letter-Word Identification test, and the 
Woodcock Johnson III Math Applied Problems test, which are the three 
tests administered at both the end of Head Start and the end of third 
grade. The source for these data is Exhibit D.1.A in the Head Start third-
grade follow-up report (Puma et al. 2012). The average effect size for 
“treatment on the treated” is 0.217 at the end of Head Start and 0.062 
at the end of third grade. If the estimates are uncorrelated, the standard 
error of the average effect size would be 0.065 at the end of Head Start 
  
 
 
Notes 85 
and 0.054 at the end of third grade. Because the estimates are probably 
positively correlated, these standard errors are understated. Therefore, 
the true effect size in third grade could be three times as great, or it could 
be negative: −0.06. 
The earnings effects of a 0.062 effect size are predicted using this 
book’s standard procedure. Head Start student percentage effects are 
based on the free lunch group only, whose future earnings are estimated 
to be 67.7 percent of the population mean. 
38. Figure 4.1 lists only some of the test score predictions noted in Table 2.1. 
Figure 4.1 focuses on test score fading, and therefore only uses tests that 
were the same at the end of the program/beginning of kindergarten and 
at third grade. These are more general cognitive tests, such as IQ tests. 
Specific achievement tests tend not to be used at the end of preschool. 
Academic achievement tests give higher predictions of adult earnings 
than more general cognitive tests. This is part of the broadening of skills 
that occurs over time as children develop. 
Test score effects used in the earnings predictions are as follows: 
CPC: Reynolds (2000), Table 9, average results for four methods con-
trolling for selection bias from Reynolds and Temple (1995); Abecedar-
ian: Campbell et al. (2001), IQ results from Table 1; Perry: Schweinhart 
et al. (2005), IQ results in Table 3.3; and Head Start test score effects 
come from the experiment’s third-grade follow-up report, as cited in 
a previous endnote. Earnings predictions were done using this book’s 
standard procedure. 
Adult earnings effects based on adult outcomes for CPC come from 
Reynolds, Temple, White, et al. (2011); for Perry, from Heckman et al. 
(2010); for Abecedarian, from Campbell et al. (2012); for Head Start, 
from Deming (2009). 
39. Gormley et al. (2010) find that the average effect size of Tulsa pre-K 
on literacy and math tests is over 70 percent greater than the effect size 
for Tulsa Head Start. Wong et al. (2008) argue that their average results 
from five states for various tests are about twice the average short-run 
effect sizes of Head Start in the recent experiment. This may exagger-
ate Head Start’s problems, as a greater portion of the Head Start control 
group will enroll in an alternative pre-K program. 
40. The test score effects in the Head Start experiment had considerably 
faded already by the end of kindergarten (end-of-kindergarten effects 
predict earnings effects of 1 percent, down from 4 percent at the end 
of the program). This rapid fading contrasts with the CPC (end-of-
kindergarten test score effects predict earnings effects of 8 percent, simi-
lar to the prediction at the beginning of kindergarten) and with Abece-
darian (first-grade effects predict earnings gains of 11 percent, down 
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from 13 percent at the end of the program). Perry also shows short-run 
fading, but still predicts much larger effects than Head Start (Perry has 
end-of-kindergarten and end-of-first-grade test score effects that predict 
earnings effects of 3 percent, down from 12 percent at the end of the 
program). Test score effects for these predictions come from the same 
sources cited in the endnote for Figure 4.1. 
41. This book’s standard prediction procedure implies that even with no real 
earnings increases, future average earnings will be $1,556,000. 
42. Cascio and Schanzenbach’s (2013) analysis of Oklahoma and Georgia 
concludes that the benefits of these programs will exceed costs if the 
programs only increase average test scores on the National Assessment 
of Educational Progress (NAEP) by between 1.0 and 1.4 scale points. 
State NAEP scores frequently jump around from one test to the next 
by many multiples of such amounts. This “noise”—by which is simply 
meant jumps in test scores due to measurement error and many random 
changes in state characteristics—often overwhelms plausible effects of 
programs. 
43. This statement is based on Cascio and Schanzenbach’s benefit-cost 
analysis using eighth-grade test scores, at a 3.4 percent discount rate, 
of around 3-to-1 (Table 8). Based on fourth-grade test score impacts, 
the benefit-cost ratio is over 7-to-1. My reanalysis of their fourth-grade 
results gets slightly larger benefits of over 11-to-1. This occurs because 
earnings effects of test scores near the mean are somewhat larger in the 
Chetty et al. (2011) estimates that I use than in the Chetty, Friedman, and 
Rockoff (2013) estimates they use. I believe Chetty et al. provides better 
predictions, because it links percentile gains rather than effect size gains 
to earnings, and Chetty et al.’s results suggest that percentile impacts are 
more uniformly linear across the test score distribution. 
Fitzpatrick (2008) has sometimes been cited (FactCheck.org 2013, 
Wall Street Journal 2013) as showing that Georgia’s program does 
not work, but her results suggest a benefit-cost ratio modestly greater 
than one for Georgia’s pre-K. If one combines Fitzpatrick’s assumption 
of a 0.09 effect size for 40 percent of Georgia’s child participants in 
pre-K and zero effects for the other 60 percent with this book’s stan-
dard test-score-to-earnings prediction procedure, the present value of 
earnings effects is 1.3 times costs, estimated at $3,652 in Cascio and 
Schanzenbach (2013). Fitzpatrick does not get this result because she 
assumes a fixed dollar effect of test score increases on hourly wages, 
which seems implausible. 
44. Cascio and Schanzenbach (2013) state that the most precise test score 
results for fourth-grade math are only significantly different from zero 
at the 20 percent level. 
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45. A possible sign of such biases is some discrepancy between results for 
the smaller sample with parental consent and the full sample (Lipsey et 
al. 2013b). The discrepancy concerns one of the few outcomes for which 
parental consent is not needed, which is whether the child is retained in 
kindergarten. The smaller sample finds that Tennessee pre-K reduces 
retention in kindergarten from 6 percent to 4 percent. The full sample 
finds that Tennessee pre-K reduces retention in kindergarten from 8 per-
cent to 4 percent. If Tennessee pre-K truly has no effect on a child’s per-
formance as of the end of kindergarten, it is strange that the full sample 
finds that the odds of retention are cut in half. 
46. It is noteworthy that Tennessee’s end of pre-K results, with an effect size 
of 0.24, imply an adult earnings effect of 4 percent, which is low for a 
full-day program compared to the 10 percent boost for low-income chil-
dren estimated in Tulsa (Bartik, Gormley, and Adelstein 2012) and the 
15 percent boost implied by results for Boston (Weiland and Yoshikawa 
2013). 
47. In these studies of how teacher-child interactions affect learning, differ-
ences between students are controlled for using only observable vari-
ables, which might leave some bias. However, many researchers would 
be inclined to believe that teacher-child interactions make a difference, 
because such an effect seems so plausible. 
48. Based on Sabol et al. (2013). The lowest-quality level is below 2.5 on 
the 7-point Classroom Assessment Scoring System (CLASS) scale of 
teacher-child interactions, and the highest quality is 5.5 or above on the 
CLASS scale (see supplementary materials for Sabol et al. 2013). The 
five cognitive test results in Table S4 were averaged to get an average 
effect size increase of the highest quality “level four” versus “level one” 
of 0.322. The earnings effects of a 0.322 effect size increase in test scores 
at the end of pre-K are calculated using this book’s standard procedure. 
49. This is calculated by multiplying the 6 percent earnings effect by the 
present value of future adult earnings for children from families eligible 
for a free or reduced-price lunch, predicted using this book’s standard 
procedure. The resulting present value of the 6 percent gain is around 
$33,000 per child, which, multiplied by 15 children per class, would 
come out to around $495,000. 
50. For example, using the results in Burchinal, Kainz, and Cai (2011), 
which show an effect size for cognitive outcomes that averages 0.0833 
for a one-standard-deviation increase in CLASS instructional support in 
a low-income sample, and using this book’s standard prediction proce-
dure, a one-standard-deviation increase in CLASS instructional support 
will raise earnings in this sample by 1.5 percent, which has a present 
value of $120,000 summed over 15 students in a class. Using results 
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from Keys et al. (2013) for a more mixed income sample—results that 
show that CLASS instructional support increases this sample’s cogni-
tive test scores by an effect size of 0.05—we find that a one-standard-
deviation increase in CLASS instructional support will increase this 
sample’s earnings by 1.1 percent, which has a present value of $131,000 
summed over 15 students in a class. (The smaller percentage increase 
yields a larger present value because this sample’s adult earnings will be 
more typical of the population.) 
51. For example, research by Mashburn et al. (2008) and Blau and Currie
(2006) suggests that structural aspects of pre-K and child care do not 
affect quality, while Travers and Goodson (1980) find evidence that 
lower class size helps improve effectiveness, and Kelley and Camilli 
(2007) survey evidence that stronger teacher credentials improve effec-
tiveness. See Bartik (2011, pp. 135–140). 
52. All of these programs used certified teachers. The available data on class 
sizes suggest they were moderate to small. Perry averaged 13 students to 
2 teachers, Abecedarian 14 students to 2 teachers, and Chicago Child– 
Parent Center pre-K averaged 17 students to 2 teachers. 
53. The increased costs are calculated by updating the figures from Table 1 
in Gault et al. (2008) to 2012 dollars. As detailed in Bartik, Gormley, and 
Adelstein (2012), the figures in Chetty et al. (2011) suggest that a one 
percentile increase in test scores increases future adult earnings in dollar 
terms for all groups by 0.495 percent of mean overall earnings. Average 
future earnings are predicted using this book’s standard baseline earn-
ings prediction procedure, described in a previous endnote. The present 
value as of age four of these average earnings is $766,000. The $2,500 
increment to costs is 0.33 percent of average earnings. Therefore, the 
needed percentile test score increase is 0.67 percent, which equals 0.33 
percent divided by 0.495. Such a $2,500 increment to earnings would be 
about 0.5 percent of the present value at age four of future earnings for 
disadvantaged children, which is calculated to be $547,000. 
54. The cost difference assumes lead teachers are paid public-school wages. 
Calculations are done similarly to the calculations for increased creden-
tial requirements, and they use similar sources. 
55. These calculations are presented and explained in Bartik (2011, pp. 137, 
152–153). 
56. For Tulsa’s full-day pre-K, percentile test-score gains for middle-class 
children are 89 percent of those for lower-income children (Bartik, 
Gormley, and Adelstein 2012). For half-day pre-K, the ratio is 88 per-
cent. In Boston, percentile test-score gains for middle-class children are 
71 percent of those for lower-income children (Bartik’s calculations, 
based on Weiland and Yoshikawa 2013). 
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57. Table 5.1 is based on Bartik, Gormley, and Adelstein (2012). However, 
estimated gains and earnings figures use this book’s standard baseline 
earnings prediction procedure. 
58. These Tulsa results average results for both free and reduced-price 
lunch children using the same overall weights. These Tulsa results, from
Bartik, Gormley, and Adelstein (2012), can be challenged because they 
cannot control for differences in unobserved characteristics between 
families that opt for half-day versus full-day pre-K. However, similar 
diminishing returns to a longer pre-K day are found in a random assign-
ment experiment in New Jersey (Robin, Frede, and Barnett 2006). See 
Bartik (2011, p. 145) for more discussion. 
59. These diminishing returns are based on the kindergarten test score 
effects of children in the Chicago Child-Parent Center who participated 
in two years versus one year (Reynolds 1995). Bartik (2011, p. 146) 
explains the calculations. Reynolds, Temple, White, et al. (2011) report 
similar diminishing returns based on an overall benefit-cost evaluation 
of two-year and one-year participants in CPC. Other studies are more 
pessimistic about the returns to adding a second year of pre-K. The 
supplement to Reynolds, Temple, Ou, et al. (2011) finds no evidence of 
any annual earnings or educational attainment differentials between the 
two-year group and the one-year group. Arteaga et al. (2014) also find 
no advantages for educational attainment or economic status between 
the two-year group and the one-year group. Finally, the meta-analysis in 
Leak et al. (2010) also suggests diminishing returns, although the extent 
differs with whether weights are used in the regressions. With weights, a 
two-year program only has an effect size larger by 0.02 than the baseline 
one-year program at 0.21, a 10 percent increase. Without weights, the 
prediction is that the two-year program will have an effect size that is 
higher by 0.11, about a 50 percent increase. 
60. Based on Bartik, Gormley, and Adelstein (2012), but updating to 2012 
national earnings using this book’s standard procedure, a half-day pre-K 
program for children whose families are eligible for a free or reduced-
price lunch will have a present value of future earnings gains of $32,742. 
The costs of a program with a child-to-teacher ratio of 15-to-2, paying 
certified teacher wages, will be $5,418 in 2012 dollars, based on Gault 
et al. (2008). The resulting ratio of earnings benefits to costs is 6.04. 
The full-day program, summarized in Chapter 2, has earnings benefits 
of $52,920, costs of $10,050. The net additional benefits of going from 
a half-day to a full-day program are $20,178, the net additional costs are 
$4,652, and the resulting incremental benefit-cost ratio is 4.36. 
61. The review by Leak et al. (2010) is also consistent with this finding. As 
summarized by Duncan and Magnuson (2013, p. 115), “Analysis of the 
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meta-analytic database shows that . . . effect sizes were neither larger nor 
smaller for children who started programs at younger ages.” Because 
these younger-age programs will have smaller class sizes, this implies 
lower benefit-cost ratios. 
62. For an example of this perspective, see Dinesh D’Souza, as discussed in 
Bartik (2011, p. 319). 
63. To be exact, $1,245,000 is the estimated dollar value of increased earn-
ings from college graduation over a career without any secular wage 
increases or discounting. This college graduation premium is $2,168,000 
with annual 1.2 percent real wage increases, and $571,000 if this $2.2 
million is discounted at 3 percent annually. 
64. Spillover wage benefits may not be uniform across all other groups. 
Moretti’s estimates suggest greater nominal wage benefits for non–
college graduates, while Diamond, in contrast, shows that the combined 
changes in local amenities and housing prices may disproportionately 
help college graduates. At the national scale, one would expect much of 
the overall increase in prices to disappear, while the effects on produc-
tivity would remain. 
65. My 2011 book included some spillover effects, but I made relatively 
conservative assumptions that forced these spillover effects to be smaller 
than I now think is plausible. 
66. There may also be spillover effects of local skills, not only on pro-
ductivity levels but on productivity growth, as argued in Dickens and
Baschnagel (2008). 
67. The Chicago Child-Parent Center reduced students in special ed from 
25 percent to 14 percent (Reynolds, Temple, White, et al. 2011). Perry 
reduced some special ed services, for mental impairment, from 35 per-
cent to 15 percent, but increased some other special ed services. Overall 
years in special ed went from 5.2 years to 4.0 years (Schweinhart et al. 
2005). Bagnato, Salaway, and Suen (2009) found that Pennsylvania’s 
pre-K program reduced special ed services in the treatment group to 2.4 
percent, versus 18 percent in the comparison group. 
68. This averages test-score effects across five tests in Table 3 of Henry and 
Rickman (2007). 
69. Universal pre-K costs are based on Gault et al. (2008). Annual full-time 
child care/pre-K costs are Abecedarian figures from Ludwig and Sawhill 
(2007), which in turn are based on Masse and Barnett (2002). Annual 
home-visiting/parenting costs per child are from the NFP (http://www
.nursefamilypartnership.org/assets/PDF/Fact-sheets/NFP_Benefit
_Cost.aspx). Oklahoma’s state pre-K participation rate of 74 percent 
comes from Barnett et al. (2013). Assumptions for Educare on targeting 
to the poor and 75 percent take-up are the same assumptions as made by 
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Ludwig and Sawhill (2007). Assumptions for home-visiting/parenting 
are based on Isaacs (2007), who implies that 8.9 percent of all children 
are currently first births to families below 185 percent of the poverty 
line; Isaacs (2007) also assumes a 75 percent take-up rate. The number 
of children at each age under five comes from 2012 figures of the U.S. 
census. 
70. Government tax figures are for 2012, from BEA (2012). “Contributions 
for social insurance” are included in taxes. 
71. Under plausible assumptions, the direct earnings effects on former par-
ticipants of the $79 billion proposal would boost the present value of 
earnings by $207 billion, about 2.6 times the cost. This assumes that 
in the universal pre-K program, 47 percent of pre-K participants will 
be needy children who will get the higher benefit-cost ratio of 5.3, and 
the other 53 percent will be middle-class children who will get a lower 
benefit-cost ratio of 4.7 to 1 (see Table 5.1). The current $6 billion spent 
on state pre-K is assumed to be split 85 percent to needy children, 15 
percent to middle-class children. We then add in the incremental costs 
and benefits of the Educare and NFP proposals using Table 3.1. 
72. The CBO classifies households into income quintiles based on before-
tax income, adjusted for household size. 
73. Average after-tax and transfer real income growth for all households 
from 1979 to 2007 was 67.5 percent, compared to 41.0 percent for the 
lowest-income quintile and 34.8 percent for the middle-income quintile. 
Dividing 1.675 by 1.41 yields 1.19, and dividing 1.675 by 1.348 yields 
1.24, so the last year’s income of these two groups needs to be blown up 
by 19 percent and 24 percent to match average overall income growth. 
These figures come from Supplemental Data files, Table 6, at http:// 
www.cbo.gov/publication/43373. 
74. For the average lowest-income-quintile household in 2007, total labor 
income was 61.1 percent of after-tax and transfer market income. So an 
earnings boost of 19 percent / 0.611 = 31 percent would be required to 
make up for lost income growth relative to the average household. For 
the middle-income quintile, 77 percent of those families’ after-tax and 
transfer market income was labor income, so a labor income boost of 24 
percent / 0.77 = 31 percent would be required to make up for lagging 
real income growth. 
75. A recent review argues that “multiple recent studies suggest a highly 
promising route to quality in preschool education: providing support for 
teachers to implement evidence-based curricula and instruction through 
coaching and mentoring” (Yoshikawa et al. 2013, p. 15). 
76. For the half-day program considered in Bartik (2011), the ratio of the 
present value of earnings to program costs was 2.78 from a state per-
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spective, 3.79 from a national perspective. The ratio of the state benefits 
to the national benefits is 73 percent = 2.78 / 3.79. 
77. If universal pre-K increases property values by six times annual program 
costs, annual property taxes raised would be 8 percent of annual pro-
gram costs (Bartik 2011, Table 7.3). 
78. This 4 percent figure may seem low considering that K–12 covers 13 
grades and pre-K corresponds to one grade. However, consider the fol-
lowing: The gross cost is $31 billion, with the $25 billion net cost due to 
states already spending $6 billion on pre-K for four-year-olds; average 
public school expenditure divided by fall enrollment count in 2010–2011 
was $12,048 (National Center for Education Statistics 2013), almost 20 
percent more than the cost per child of universal pre-K of $10,050; the 
assumed enrollment in universal pre-K at age four is 3.0 million, which 
is well below one-thirteenth of total K–12 enrollment of around 49 mil-
lion, both because of lower births in recent years and because of the 
assumption that only 74 percent of all students will take up universal 
pre-K given the presence of Head Start as well as parents choosing other 
alternatives. 
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